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Banks, Marijuana, and 
Federalism 
Julie Andersen Hill† 
Abstract 
Although marijuana is illegal under federal law, twenty-three 
states have legalized some marijuana use. The state-legal marijuana 
industry is flourishing, but marijuana-related businesses report diffi-
culty accessing banking services. Because financial institutions will 
not allow marijuana-related businesses to open accounts, the mari-
juana industry largely operates on a cash-only basis—a situation that 
attracts thieves and tax cheats.  
This Article explores the root of the marijuana banking problem 
as well as possible solutions. It explains that although the United 
States’ dual banking system comprises both federal- and state-
chartered institutions, when it comes to marijuana banking, federal 
regulation is pervasive and controlling. Marijuana banking access 
cannot be solved by the states acting alone for two reasons. First, 
marijuana is illegal under federal law. Second, federal law enforcement 
and federal financial regulators have significant power to punish 
institutions that do not comply with federal law. Unless Congress acts 
to remove one or both of these barriers, most financial institutions 
will not provide services to the marijuana industry. But marijuana 
banking requires more than just congressional action. It requires that 
federal financial regulators set clear and achievable due diligence 
requirements for institutions with marijuana-business customers. As 
long as financial institutions risk federal punishment for any mari-
juana business customer’s misstep, institutions will not provide 
marijuana banking. 
 
†  Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. This 
Article was presented at the Marijuana, Federal Power, and the States 
Symposium hosted by Case Western Reserve School of Law. The 
comments I received from symposium participants were invaluable. I am 
also grateful to Michael Hill for his helpful comments on this Article. To 
ward off marijuana jokes from my family and friends, I note that I have 
never used marijuana and do not intend to start.  
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Introduction 
Marijuana is illegal under federal criminal law.1 Notwithstanding 
the federal ban, twenty-three states and the District of Columbia 
have legalized medical marijuana use. 2  Some states have moved 
 
1. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012) (making it unlawful “to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense . . . a controlled substance”); id. § 802(6) (defining 
controlled substance to include drugs in “schedule I”); id. § 812 (class-
ifying marijuana as a schedule I drug). 
2. Alaska Stat. § 17.37.030 (2012); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-2811 
(2014); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (West 2007); Colo. 
Const. art. XVIII, § 14; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-408a (West Supp. 
2014); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4903A (Supp. 2014); D.C. Code § 7-
1671.02 (2012); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 329-125 (2014); 410 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 130/25 (West Supp. 2014); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, 
§ 2423-A (Supp. 2014); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 13-3313 
(West Supp. 2014); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 94C App., § 1-3 (West 
Supp. 2014); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.26424 (West Supp. 2014); 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 152.32 (West 2014); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-46-
319 (2013); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 453A.200 (Lexis-Nexis Supp. 2013); 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126-X:2 (Supp. 2014); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 24:6I-6 (West Supp. 2014); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2B-4 (2014); N.Y. 
Pub. Health Law § 3362 (McKinney 2014); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 475.319 (West Supp. 2014); R.I. Gen. Laws § 21-28.6-4 (2014); Vt. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4474b (2014); Wash. Rev. Code § 69.51A.040 
(2015). Additional states allow oil derived from marijuana to treat 
seizures. Ala. Code Ann. § 13A-12-214.2 (2014); Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§ 381.986 (West 2014); Iowa Code § 124D (2015); Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 218A.010(21)(b) (West 2014); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-
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beyond medical marijuana to recreational marijuana. Colorado and 
Washington first allowed recreational marijuana use.3 Alaska, Oregon, 
and the District of Columbia now also allow recreational marijuana.4 
Whether for medicinal or recreational use, state legalization of 
marijuana conflicts with the federal ban. This tension has been called 
“one of the most important federalism disputes in a generation.”5 
Yet many are willing to declare that, at least for practical 
purposes, the marijuana federalism battle has been won by the states. 
They conclude that “[t]he reality on the ground today is that the 
federal ban on marijuana is largely toothless.”6 Because the federal 
government lacks (or refuses to deploy) law enforcement resources, 
people are largely free to grow, sell, and use marijuana so long as they 
act consistently with state law.7 But this narrative largely overlooks 
 
136(4)(2014); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 195.207 (2014); Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 39-17-402(16)(A)-(B) (2014); Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4.3 (Lexis-
Nexis Supp. 2014); Wis. Stat. § 961.14(4)(t) (2014). 
3. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16; Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401(3) 
(West Supp. 2014).  
4. Alaska Ballot Measure 2: An Act to Tax and Regulate the Production, 
Sale and Use of Marijuana (2014) (to be codified at Alaska Stat. 
§§ 17.38.010 to .900) (taking effect in February 2015); Oregon Ballot 
Measure 91: Control, Regulation, and Taxation of Marijuana and 
Industrial Hemp Act (2014) (allowing home possession and cultivation 
beginning in July 2015 and allowing marijuana business applications be-
ginning in January 2016); Washington, D.C. Initiative 71: Legalization 
of Possession of Minimal Amounts of Marijuana for Personal Use Act of 
2014 (taking effect after a thirty-day review period). But see Consol-
idated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 
113-235 div. E, tit. VIII, § 809 (denying funding to Washington, D.C. 
for implementing a marijuana regulation system). 
5. Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and 
the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1421, 1425 (2009); see also David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: 
Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate 
States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, 569 (2013) (“Marijuana legalization 
by the states presents the most pressing and complex federalism issue of 
our time.”). 
6. Robert A. Mikos, Medical Marijuana and the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 89 Denv. U. L. Rev. 997, 998 (2012); see also Todd 
Grabarsky, Conflicting Federal and State Medical Marijuana Policies: A 
Threat to Cooperative Federalism, 116 W. Va. L. Rev. 1, 15 (2013) 
(concluding that federal enforcement of a marijuana ban “is not likely to 
make a sizable dent in the reduction of medical marijuana usage”); 
Darrell G. Ford & Marty Ludlum, Medical Marijuana and Employment 
Discrimination, 23 So. L.J. 289, 309 (2013) (“Federal enforcement may 
be irrelevant in any event since only 1% of marijuana arrests occur at 
the federal level.”). 
7. Grabarsky, supra note 6, at 15 (“[T]he federal government hardly has 
the resources or know-how to pursue local drug crimes . . . .”); Mikos, 
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the federal government’s substantial power to conscript private 
parties into its law enforcement efforts. Perhaps nowhere is the federal 
government’s indirect law enforcement power greater than in the area 
of banking.8 
It is well documented that marijuana-related entities in states 
where marijuana is legal have difficulty obtaining banking services.9 
The banking drought extends beyond businesses that directly handle 
marijuana. For example, Wells Fargo Bank closed the account of 
Marijuana Ventures, a magazine aimed at cannabis growers and 
retailers.10 When the marijuana industry asks federal and state finan-
cial institutions why they will not provide banking services, the insti-
tutions point to federal law.11 
Lack of banking services stands as a formidable barrier to growth 
of the state-legal marijuana industry. Without access to banking ser-
vices, marijuana businesses must conduct transactions in cash and 
 
supra note 6, at 1009 (“Today . . . the federal government lacks the 
fiscal and political capital needed to enforce [the marijuana] ban aggress-
ively and to quash the burgeoning medical marijuana movement.”). 
8. Other indirect ways to limit the growth of the state-legal marijuana 
industry include taxing marijuana businesses and restricting marijuana 
growers’ access to water from federal irrigation projects. See Benjamin 
Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, 
525 (2014); Nicholas K. Geranios, Feds Don’t Want Irrigation Water 
Used to Grow Pot, Seattle Times, May 21, 2014, at B8, available at 
2014 WLNR 13714405. 
9. See, e.g., Sam Kamin, The Limits of Marijuana Legalization in the 
States, 99 Iowa L. Rev. Bull. 39, 47 (2014) (“One of the most uni-
versally acknowledged problems with the current state of affairs, 
however, is the difficulty that marijuana businesses have in obtaining 
basic banking services.”). 
10. Marc Stiles, Bank Terrified by Even the Mention of the Word Mari-
juana, Puget Sound Bus. J., June 25, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 
16832820. After press reports of Marijuana Ventures’s banking travails, 
Wells Fargo agreed to accept the business’s deposits. Marc Stiles, Bank 
Isn’t Afraid of the Word “Marijuana” After All, Puget Sound Bus. J., 
Jun. 23, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 17057524. 
11. See, e.g., David Migoya, Financing for Shop Lessors Could Lessen, 
Denver Post, Feb. 19, 2014, at A1 (“‘Our policy of not banking 
marijuana-related businesses . . . is based on applicable federal laws,’ 
[Wells Fargo Bank] spokeswoman Christie Drumm said in an e-mail.”); 
Steven A. Rosenberg, Marijuana Businesses May Be Cash Only; Banks 
Cite US Law in Shunning State’s Industry, Boston Globe, Aug. 10, 
2014, at Z1 (“‘As a federally regulated financial institution, we abide by 
federal law and do not bank marijuana-related businesses,’ said Mark 
Pipitone, a spokesman for Bank of America.”); David Pierson, Cash 
Crop Shunned by Banks, Legitimate Pot Sellers Must Deal in Currency, 
Posing Safety and Logistical Problems, L.A. Times, Nov. 28, 2014, at 1 
(“Representatives for Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and JP Morgan 
Chase said they adhere to federal laws when choosing customers.”). 
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spend an inordinate amount of time and resources on cash manage-
ment. From vaults, to cameras, to security personnel, to finding sup-
pliers that accept cash payment, managing cash can quickly become a 
logistical and security nightmare.12 In Colorado, the controller of one 
recreational marijuana retailer described cash management as “a full-
time job.”13 Stories abound concerning marijuana retailers attempting 
to surreptitiously drive large quantities of concealed cash across town 
just to pay tax bills.14 
At the same time, lack of banking services equates to a lack of 
capital for the marijuana industry. Banks are the traditional backbone 
of small business financing,15 but banks will not lend to marijuana-
related businesses.16 The state-legal marijuana industry must instead 
“rely on short-term loans from individuals, usually with higher inter-
est rates.”17 Even if a marijuana-related business finds financing, there 
is still the problem of not having a bank account. As a marijuana 
retailer hoping to finance the one-million-dollar purchase of a new 
building explains, “What do you say? . . . I want it in cash, guys?”18  
The banking problem also raises hurdles for states seeking to 
allow but regulate marijuana use. Notwithstanding the security efforts 
of marijuana businesses themselves, the combination of marijuana and 
cash raises local law enforcement concerns.19 Even federal officials re- 
12. Alex Altman, Pot’s Money Problem, Time, Jan. 27, 2014, at 32 
(describing how “marijuana moguls” “lease secret off-site warehouses to 
store their money and pay employees with cash-stuffed envelopes”). 
13. Eric Gorski, Herb Empire: A Series About the Recreational Marijuana 
Industry—Holding the Bags, Denver Post, June 15, 2014, at 1A. 
14. See id. (delivering $122,000 to tax authorities); Serge F. Kovaleski, 
Banks Say No to Marijuana Money, Legal or Not, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 
2014, at A1 (delivering $51,000 to tax authorities). 
15. See Nat’l Small Bus. Ass’n, Small Business Access to Capital 
Survey 4 (2012), available at http://www.nsba.biz/wp-content/uploads 
/2012/07/Access-to-Capital-Survey.pdf (reporting that within the last 
twelve months, 43% of small business survey respondents used a 
revolving line of credit from a bank, 37% used credit cards, and 29% 
used a bank loan).  
16. Kovaleski, supra note 14 (“[L]egal marijuana operations, for the most 
part, cannot get bank loans . . . .”). 
17. Id. 
18. Gorski, supra note 13. 
19. See, e.g., Steven A. Rosenberg, Security Will Be Key at Medical Mari-
juana Sites: One Chief Voices Fear Police Can’t Handle All Criminal 
Threats, Boston Globe, Feb. 13, 2014, at Reg. 1 (“Several [police] 
chiefs, including Plymouth’s Michael Botieri and Lowell Police Super-
intendent William Taylor, are concerned about the amount of cash dis-
pensaries will generate.”); Gorski, supra note 13 (reporting that “the 
Denver Police Department warned marijuana business couriers of a plot 
to rob them”). 
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cognize the “public safety” concern caused by “[s]ubstantial amounts 
of cash, just kind of lying around with no place for it to be ap-
propriately deposited.”20 So far media reports of successful robberies 
and related violence are limited but chilling.21  
Perhaps more importantly from a public policy standpoint,22 when 
marijuana-related businesses are outside the banking system, those 
businesses are harder to tax and regulate.23 Colorado and Washington 
allow recreational marijuana use but regulate marijuana similarly to 
alcohol. They prohibit the sale of marijuana to minors,24 require that 
businesses be registered,25 and take other regulatory measures de-
signed to keep the marijuana industry separate from other illegal 
drugs.26 Both states plan to fund the monitoring and registration of 
 
20. American Forum: A Conversation with Attorney General Eric Holder 
(Miller Center, University of Virginia PBS television broadcast April 23, 
2014), available at http://millercenter.org/events/2014/a-conversation-
with-eric-holder.  
21. Altman, supra note 12, at 34 (“In July, a medical-marijuana-dispensary 
owner and a security guard were shot and killed during an apparent 
robbery in Bakersfield, Calif. In October 2012 the industry was shaken 
by the grisly tale of three people who allegedly kidnapped the owner of a 
lucrative dispensary in Orange County. According to court documents, 
the assailants zip-tied the victim, tortured him and drove him to a 
patch of desert where they believed he had buried large sums of money. 
When the kidnappers could not find it, they allegedly burned him with 
a blowtorch, cut off his penis and doused him with bleach before 
dumping him along the side of a road. (He survived.)”).  
22. Other cash-intensive businesses find ways to successfully manage their 
robbery risk, typically through a combination of security measures and 
insurance. Unless somehow constrained, a cash-intensive marijuana 
industry would eventually do the same. While this would probably be 
less efficient for the marijuana industry than just contracting with 
banks, it may suggest that in the long-term, public safety concerns are 
not paramount. 
23. See Kamin, supra note 9, at 47 (“If marijuana exists as a cash only 
business, the risk of illegal diversion and non-payment of taxes is 
necessarily magnified.”); Steve Lynn, Cash-Only Pot Sales Irk State, 
Owners, BizWest (Apr. 4, 2014), http://bizwest.com/cash-only-pot-
sales-irk-state-owners/.  
24. Colo. Const. art. 18, § 16(1)(b)(II); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 69.50.357 (West Supp. 2015) (“Licensed marijuana retailers shall not 
employ persons under twenty-one years of age or allow persons under 
twenty-one years of age to enter or remain on the premises of a retail 
outlet.”); id. § 69.50.360 (providing no criminal or civil safe harbor for 
retailers that sell marijuana to those under twenty-one). 
25. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-43.4-401 (2014); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 69.50.325 (West Supp. 2015). 
26. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-43.4-306 (2014) (prohibiting individ-
uals “whose criminal history indicates that he or she is not of good 
moral character” from owning or financing marijuana businesses); 
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growers, distributors, retailers, and medical users by taxing the mari-
juana industry itself.27 But cash businesses have opportunities and 
incentives to underreport taxes.28 Without anticipated tax revenues, 
states could potentially have trouble funding their regulatory struc-
tures. Cash businesses may also be more likely to funnel earnings to 
illicit activities.29 Finally, tax authorities (including federal tax auth-
orities) prefer to be paid by check, credit card, or electronic deposit, 
rather than with bags of cash smelling of weed.30 
In short, it is unsurprising that banking has been described as 
“the most urgent issue facing the legal cannabis industry today.”31  
 
Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.331(9) (2014) (allowing the state to consider 
“chronic illegal activity associated with the applicant’s operations” in 
issuing or renewing a marijuana business permit). 
27. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-43.3-501(1), 39-28.8-501 (2014); Wash. 
Rev. Code § 69.50.540(4) (2014). 
28. Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in 
Tax Compliance, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1453, 1504–05 (2003) (“Cash busi-
nesses present not only great opportunities for tax evasion but also a 
strong financial incentive to do so.”); Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart 
Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 
Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 37 (2009) (concluding that small cash busi-
nesses tend to evade taxes because the likelihood of being caught is low 
and because others in the same position also evade taxes). The tax 
collection problem could extend well beyond marijuana businesses them-
selves. For example, if a marijuana dispensary pays employees and 
suppliers in cash, tax authorities might have trouble tracking and taxing 
those payments.  
29. See Aloke Chakravarty, Feeding Humanity, Starving Terror: The Utility 
of Aid in a Comprehensive Antiterrorism Financing Strategy, 32 W. 
New Eng. L. Rev. 295, 307 n.35 (2010) (noting that “cash businesses” 
are one source of funding for “terrorist organizations”). 
30. Lynn, supra note 23. The IRS has assessed a 10% penalty to legal 
marijuana businesses that pay quarterly employee withholding taxes by 
cash rather than by wire through the Electronic Federal Tax Payment 
System. David Migoya, IRS Fining Firms for Paying in Cash, Denver 
Post, July 3, 2014, at 1A. After one marijuana business challenged the 
penalty in tax court, the IRS agreed to refund its penalties. David 
Migoya, IRS Deal Will Refund Fines to Denver Pot Shop, Denver 
Post, Mar. 20, 2015, at 10A. However, “[i]t remains unclear whether 
the IRS settlement will extend to other marijuana businesses.” Id. 
31. Kovaleski, supra note 14 (quoting Aaron Smith, executive director of 
the National Cannabis Industry Association in Washington, D.C.); see 
also Trish Regan, Dazed, Confused About Pot at Bank: Federal Moves 
Unlikely to Open Many Doors for Marijuana Dispensaries, USA 
Today, Feb. 19, 2014, at 1B (calling “lack of access to banks” “the 
biggest challenge facing the almost-legal marijuana industry”); Walter 
Hickey, Legalized Pot: Our Exclusive Look Inside America’s Emerging 
Marijuana Industry, Bus. Insider, Aug 14, 2013, http://www.business 
insider.com/legal-marijuana-in-colorado-2013-8 (identifying “banking re-
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At its root, the issue of marijuana banking—like the issue of state 
legalization of marijuana more broadly—is a federalism issue. Since 
1863, the United States has had a dual banking system with both 
federal- and state-chartered financial institutions.32 Yet, states often 
have little power in this dual banking system. This Article catalogs 
pervasive federal control over virtually all financial institutions. 
Federal control has important implications for how the marijuana 
industry can secure banking services.  
As Part I explains, current criminal law gives federal authorities 
broad power to punish financial institutions that do business with the 
marijuana industry. In addition, federal banking regulators have 
expansive powers to discipline financial institutions, even state-char-
tered institutions, for providing services to the marijuana industry. 
States, on the other hand, have comparatively little power. States 
cannot stop the federal government from choosing to enforce federal 
criminal law, and they have little say in what activities federal 
regulators determine are too risky for financial institutions.  
Notwithstanding this broad federal control, some proposals for 
banking the marijuana industry stop short of major revisions to 
federal law. First, federal agencies have issued guidance for financial 
institutions and the marijuana industry. The guidance explains that 
the agencies do not prioritize punishment of banks servicing state-
legal marijuana businesses.33 But the guidance is not binding and 
reiterates the need for expansive compliance measures. Second, Colo-
 
strictions” as one of “the biggest challenges facing entrepreneurs in the 
Colorado marijuana industry”).  
32. See National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863); Na-
tional Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (allowing the fed-
eral government to charter and regulate national banks). Before 1863 
financial institutions were only chartered under state law. See generally 
1 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United 
States: From Christopher Columbus to the Robber Barons 
(1492–1900), at 170, 217 (2002).  
33. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to United 
States Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305201382 
9132756857467.pdf [hereinafter Cole Marijuana Enforcement Memoran-
dum 2013]; Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep’t of the 
Treasury, FIN-2014-G001, BSA Expectations Regarding Mari-
juana-Related Businesses (2014), http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_ 
regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2014-G001.pdf [hereinafter FinCEN Mari-
juana-Related Businesses Guidance]; Memorandum from James M. 
Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to United States Att’ys, Guidance Regarding 
Marijuana Related Financial Crimes (Feb. 14, 2014), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/usao/waw/press/newsblog%20pdfs/DAG%20Memo%20
-%20Guidance%20Regarding%20Marijuana%20Related%20Financial%20
Crimes%202%2014%2014%20(2).pdf [hereinafter Cole Marijuana Related 
Financial Crimes Memorandum]. 
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rado passed legislation authorizing financial cooperatives to bank 
marijuana businesses.34 The cooperatives, however, are not beyond the 
federal government’s reach. In fact, the state statute requires approval 
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve before any 
cooperative begins operations.35 Part II of the Article discusses these 
proposed avenues for banking the marijuana industry and explains 
why they fall short.  
Given the pervasive nature of federal criminal and banking laws, 
Part III argues that widespread banking access for the marijuana 
industry is unlikely unless Congress acts. However, even if Congress 
acts, federal financial regulators will retain significant power to 
discourage banks from servicing the marijuana industry. If federal 
financial regulators insist that proper risk management requires 
institutions to confirm that marijuana business customers are fully 
compliant with every aspect of state and federal law, then few banks 
will offer marijuana banking. For marijuana banking to flourish, 
federal financial regulators must ensure that their efforts do not 
practically prevent banks from servicing the marijuana industry.  
I. Dual Banking and Marijuana 
The United States has a dual banking system: banks can choose a 
federal charter issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency or a state charter from a state banking regulator.36 Likewise, 
credit unions can generally choose a federal charter from the National 
Credit Union Administration (NCUA) or a state charter from a state 
credit union regulator.37 Indeed, the federalism represented by the 
 
34. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 11-33-101 to -128 (2014). 
35. Id. § 11-33-104(4)(a). 
36. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.20 (2014) (describing the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency’s process for chartering a national bank); 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1813(a)(2) (2012) (defining the term “[s]tate bank” as “any bank . . . 
incorporated under the laws of any State”); Ala. Code §§ 5-5A-1 to 5-
5A-16 (2014) (describing the process for chartering a state bank in Ala-
bama).  
37. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1753, 1752(6) (2012) (describing the NCUA’s require-
ments for a federally chartered credit union and defining “state credit 
union” as “a credit union organized and operated according to the laws 
of any State . . . which laws provide for the organization of credit 
unions similar in principle and objectives to Federal credit unions”); 
Ala. Code § 5-17-2 (2014) (describing the procedure for chartering a 
state credit union in Alabama). Delaware, South Dakota, and Wyoming 
do not have state credit union acts and do not charter state credit 
unions. Michael Edwards, The Changing Landscape of Financial 
Services Law in 2009: Federal Preemption, Credit Rating Agency 
Liability, and Regulatory Reform Legislation, 6 Bus. L. Brief., 34 n.40 
(Fall/Winter 2009–2010). 
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dual banking system has been described as “competitive” because 
regulators compete to charter institutions. 38  In general, national 
financial institutions must follow a set of federal laws while state 
institutions must follow state law. If the dual banking system were 
truly dichotomous (federal law only regulated national institutions 
and state law only regulated state institutions), the answer for 
marijuana banking would be clear: state-chartered institutions in 
states where marijuana is legal would be free to provide banking 
services to marijuana-related entities. 
But state and federal financial institution regulators do not “oper-
ate in distinct spheres.”39 The federal government has some regulatory 
control over state institutions, and state government has some control 
over federal institutions.40 It is not uncommon for federal and state 
regulators to coordinate their enforcement efforts.41 Thus, some de-
scribe banking federalism as “cooperative.”42  
Others still have proclaimed the “dual banking system” dead, 
arguing that the current banking regulatory scheme is so pervaded by 
 
38. See, e.g., Helen A. Garten, Devolution and Deregulation: The Paradox 
of Financial Reform, 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 65, 65–66 (1996) 
(“[B]ank regulation is characterized by an uneasy sharing of power 
among competing regulatory authorities.”); Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual 
Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1, 8 (1977) (arguing that “regulatory diversity in effect allows . . . 
banks to choose the set of laws and administrators under which they 
will operate”). 
39. Cassandra Jones Havard, “Goin’ Round in Circles” . . . and Letting 
the Bad Loans Win: When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The 
Need for Uniform Broker Regulation, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 737, 766 (2008). 
40. Robert F. Roach, Bank Mergers and the Antitrust Laws: The Case for 
Dual State and Federal Enforcement, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 95, 119 
(1994) (stating that dual banking “is a symbiotic system with state 
regulatory control over federal banks as well as federal regulatory 
control over state banks”). 
41. Havard, supra note 39, at 766 (noting that “federal and state banking 
regulation co-exist with cooperation between the regulators”). 
42. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competi-
tion in the Dual Banking System, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 677, 679 (1988) 
(“The regulatory outcomes generated by the dual banking system 
appear to be cooperative rather than competitive, because Congress has 
divided up the regulatory turf of the relevant state and federal agencies 
in the way most beneficial to the groups that the system regulates.”); 
Bush Task Group Report on Regulation of Financial Services: Blueprint 
for Reform (Part 1): Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on 
Gov’t Operations, 99th Cong., 339 (1985) (“Because it has served the 
financial needs of the nation so well over time, state participation in the 
chartering and regulation of financial institutions can genuinely be 
regarded as one of the finest examples of cooperative federalism in the 
nation’s history.”). 
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federal regulation that the availability of a state bank charter has 
little impact on the banking system.43  
This section explores the dual banking system through the lens of 
state legalization of marijuana. It shows that when considering the 
marijuana question, federal control is pervasive. As an initial matter, 
federal and state financial institutions, like other businesses and in-
dividuals, must comply with lawfully enacted federal criminal laws.44 
In addition, through federal deposit insurance, federal holding com-
pany regulation, and federally administered payment systems, federal 
financial regulators have significant oversight of state-chartered banks 
and credit unions. This federal oversight currently leaves little room 
for marijuana banking. 
A. Federal Controlled Substances Act 
The federal Controlled Substances Act45 prohibits manufacturing, 
distributing, or dispensing marijuana.46 Federal law also criminalizes 
conduct beyond directly handling marijuana. It is illegal to aid and 
abet the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of marijuana.47 It is 
illegal to conspire to manufacture, distribute, or dispense marijuana.48 
And federal law punishes accessories after the fact.49 If the quantity of 
 
43. See, e.g., Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, Is There a Dual Banking 
System?, 2 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 30 (2008); see also Khalil 
Nicholas Maalouf, Note, Impediments to Financial Development in the 
Banking Sector: A Comparison of the Impact of Federalism in the 
United States and Germany, 28 Mich. J. Int’l L. 431, 440–41 (2007) 
(“Given the powerful trump that U.S. federalism allocates to the federal 
government, federal regulators have significant power over their state 
counterparts, undermining any notion of regulatory parity that the dual 
banking system’s history may intimate.”). 
44. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that “[t]his Constitution, and the 
Law of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding”). 
45. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2012).  
46. Id. §§ 841(a)(1), 802(6), 812. There are only two minor exceptions: one 
for federally sanctioned drug trials and one for a federal program that 
provides medical marijuana to a total of eight patients. See Mikos, 
supra note 5, at 1433–34. 
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“Whoever . . . aids, abets, counsels, commands, 
induces or procures” a federal crime, or “causes” a federal criminal act 
to be done, “is punishable as a principal.”). 
48. Id. § 371. 
49. Id. § 3 (“Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States 
has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in 
order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an 
accessory after the fact.”). 
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marijuana involved is large, prison time and fines for violations of the 
Controlled Substances Act are substantial.50 The Supreme Court has 
upheld the federal government’s authority to criminalize marijuana, 
even in the face of contrary state law.51  
It is not hard to imagine how a financial institution and its 
employees could run afoul of these laws by providing banking services 
to a marijuana dispensary. Suppose a marijuana entrepreneur in 
Colorado comes to a financial institution and forthrightly explains her 
proposed business. Her business needs a small inventory loan, a check-
ing account, and credit card payment processing services. By provid-
ing the loan and placing the proceeds in the checking account, the in-
stitution would be conspiring to distribute marijuana.52 By facilitating 
customers’ credit card payments, the institution would be aiding and 
abetting the distribution of marijuana.53 And by knowingly accepting 
deposits consisting of revenue from the sale of marijuana, the institu-
tion may be acting as an accessory after the fact.54 
 
50. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012) (providing that cases involving 
more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana or 1,000 marijuana plants carry 
a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in prison). Simple possess-
ion of marijuana is a less serious federal crime. See id. § 844. 
51. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 
489–95 (2001) (holding that medical necessity was not a defense to the 
Controlled Substances Act); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23–33 (2005) 
(holding that the federal government’s Commerce Clause power was 
broad enough to criminalize the cultivation of a small amount of 
medicinal marijuana for personal use). 
52. Cf. United States v. Jobe, 101 F.3d 1046 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding 
bank employees’ convictions for conspiracy to commit bank fraud when 
employees processed fraudulent transactions after receiving enough 
information to conclude that the payments were fraudulent); Conant v. 
Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a doctor 
would conspire to violate the Controlled Substances Act if the “doctor 
[had] knowledge that a patient intends to acquire marijuana, agree[d] to 
help the patient acquire marijuana, and intend[ed] to help the patient 
acquire marijuana”). 
53. Cf. United States v. Speer, 40 M.J. 230 (C.M.A. 1994) (holding that the 
defendant aided and abetted the offense of drug distribution by 
accepting cash payment from the buyer, even though the delivery of the 
drugs had been completed, because the defendant facilitated the 
“financial climax of the deal”); United States v. Burroughs, 12 M.J. 380, 
381 (C.M.A. 1982) (upholding a criminal conviction for aiding and 
abetting the sale of marijuana when the defendant was “merely present 
at the scene of the crime and made change for the twenty dollar bill” 
used to purchase the marijuana); Conant, 309 F.3d at 636 (noting that 
“[a] doctor would aid and abet by acting with the specific intent to 
provide a patient with the means to acquire marijuana”). 
54. Cf. Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 1939) (explaining 
that a defendant would be guilty of aiding and abetting a crime if (1) a 
crime was committed by the principal, (2) the defendant knew that the 
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The Department of Justice has warned that “[p]ersons who are in 
the business of cultivating, selling or distributing marijuana, and 
those who knowingly facilitate such activities, are in violation of the 
Controlled Substances Act, regardless of state law.” 55  Moreover, 
“[s]tate laws or local ordinances are not a defense to . . . criminal 
enforcement of federal law . . . including enforcement of the [Con-
trolled Substances Act].”56 
At the same time, the Department of Justice has acknowledged 
its “limited investigative and prosecutorial resources” and suggested 
that the federal government may ignore some Controlled Substances 
Act violations in states that legalize and regulate marijuana use.57 In a 
2013 memorandum, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole laid out 
the following federal law enforcement priorities: 
Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; 
Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to 
criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; 
Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is 
legal under state law in some form to other states; 
Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being 
used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal 
drugs or other illegal activity; 
Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation 
and distribution of marijuana; 
Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other 
adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana 
use; 
 
principal committed the crime, and (3) “having such knowledge, the 
defendant aided and assisted the principal to escape punishment by 
suppressing important evidence . . . [by] conceal[ing] . . . the fruits 
and proceeds of the offense”). 
55. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to United States 
Att’ys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking 
to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use 2 (June 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijua 
na-use.pdf [hereinafter Cole Memorandum 2011]. 
56. Id. See also Cole Marijuana Enforcement Memorandum 2013, supra note 
33, at 4 (stating that no “state or local law provides a legal defense to a 
violation of federal law, including any civil or criminal violation of the 
[Controlled Substances Act]”). 
57. Cole Marijuana Enforcement Memorandum 2013, supra note 33, at 1. 
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Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the 
attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by 
marijuana production on public lands; and 
Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property.58 
The memorandum further explains that “[i]n jurisdictions that 
have enacted laws legalizing marijuana in some form and that have 
also implemented strong and effective regulatory and enforcement 
systems . . . conduct in compliance with those laws and regulations 
is less likely to threaten the federal priorities.”59  
The federal government, however, did not promise immunity from 
federal law. Regardless of state law, individuals, businesses, and 
financial institutions that violate the Controlled Substances Act can 
be prosecuted under federal law.60 Even if the federal government does 
not prosecute financial institutions directly, institutions risk losing 
money as a result of criminal and civil forfeiture laws allowing federal 
officials to seize marijuana-related property, including bank ac-
counts.61  
B. Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statutes 
Federal law, however, expects financial institutions to do more 
than merely avoid assisting those who manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense marijuana. Financial institutions must discover illegal activ-
ity, report it to federal officials, and prevent wrongdoers from 
accessing the banking system.  
The Money Laundering Control Act62 makes individuals and enti-
ties subject to criminal liability for money laundering. There are 
several ways to commit the offense of money laundering, but two are 
especially relevant to financial institutions considering marijuana 
banking. First, a financial institution commits money laundering by 
conducting a financial transaction involving the proceeds of a known 
 
58. Id. at 1–2 (quoting bullet points exactly as found in the Cole Marijuana 
Enforcement Memorandum 2013). 
59. Id. at 3. 
60. Id. at 4 (explaining that nothing in the memorandum “precludes investi-
gation or prosecution, even in the absence of any one of the [priority] 
factors listed [in the memorandum], in particular circumstances where 
investigation and prosecution otherwise serves an important federal in-
terest”). 
61. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 853, 881(a)(6) (2012) (providing for criminal and civil 
forfeitures); see also Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 
57 Vand. L. Rev. 783, 815–18 (2004) (discussing the use of federal 
criminal and civil forfeiture statutes in the enforcement of federal drug 
laws). 
62.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–57 (2012).  
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“specified unlawful activity” while “knowing that the transaction is 
designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, the 
location, the source, the ownership or the control of the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity or to avoid a transaction reporting 
requirement under State or Federal law.”63 Second, a financial institu-
tion commits money laundering if it “knowingly engages or attempts 
to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of 
a value greater than $10,000.”64 Lest there be any doubt, the “manu-
facture, importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance,” 
including marijuana, is a “specified unlawful activity” under the 
money laundering statute.65 Both types of money laundering can re-
sult in substantial fines and imprisonment.66  
Press reports suggest that because financial institutions are well 
aware of the anti–money laundering laws, some marijuana businesses 
attempt to gain access to banking services by disguising the nature of 
their business. As one owner of medical marijuana dispensaries in 
Washington explains, “Your savvy business owners know how to open 
a holding company, get a banking account through that holding 
company, and put their assets underneath that holding company. . . . 
The only way to really get banking is to not give the bank the entire 
story.”67 
Of course, these surreptitious businesses may be subject to money 
laundering charges themselves.68 Moreover, it is far from clear that 
such measures result in long-term access to the banking system; 
banking law does not allow financial institutions to simply take 
customer assertions at face value. 
 
63. Id. § 1956(a)(1)(B). 
64. Id. § 1957(a). 
65. Id. §§ 1956(c)(7), 1957(f)(3); see also Cole Memorandum 2011, supra 
note 55, at 2 (“Those who engage in transactions involving the proceeds 
of [the cultivation, sale, or distribution of marijuana] may also be in 
violation of federal money laundering statutes . . . .”). 
66. Id. § 1956(a) (allowing “a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the 
value of the property involved in the transactions, whichever is greater, 
or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both”); id. § 
1957(b) (allowing for a fine and “imprisonment for not more than ten 
years or both”).  
67. Jacob Sullum, Marijuana Money in the Mattress, Reason, July 2014, at 
32–33. 
68. Sam Kamin, Cooperative Federalism and State Marijuana Regulation, 
85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1105, 1115 (2014) (noting that when marijuana 
businesses “attempt to bank surreptitiously, through the use of their 
personal accounts or holding companies designed to purge the taint of 
marijuana transactions[,]” those businesses become open to the “threat 
of money-laundering charges”). 
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Under the Bank Secrecy Act69 and the USA PATRIOT Act,70 
financial institutions71 must maintain robust programs designed to 
prevent money laundering.72 Every financial institution must imple-
ment a customer identification program to make reasonable efforts to 
“verify the identity of any person seeking to open an account.”73 Even 
when the “person” opening an account is a business, a financial insti-
tution must verify the identity of the prospective accountholder.74 
Verifying the identity of the customer is only the beginning. 
Federal regulators expect institutions to undertake sufficient due dili-
gence on each customer to adequately assess the risk associated with 
that customer.75 For “higher-risk” accounts (like accounts belonging to 
 
69. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S.C.).  
70. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S.C.).  
71. The Bank Secrecy Act applies broadly to all banks, credit unions, and a 
number of other entities that may facilitate money laundering. See 31 
U.S.C. § 5312 (2012) (defining the term “financial institution” broadly). 
72. Id. § 5318(h) (requiring that financial institutions have (1) “internal 
[anti–money laundering] policies, procedures, and controls,” (2) a “com-
pliance officer,” (3) “ongoing employee training,” and (4) “an indepen-
dent audit function to test programs”). 
73. Id. § 5318(l); 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220 (2014). These are commonly referred 
to as “know your customer” requirements. 
74. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220(a)(2)(ii)(C) (providing that an institu-
tion’s customer identification program “must address situations where, 
based on the bank’s risk assessment of a new account opened by a 
customer that is not an individual, the bank will obtain information 
about individuals with authority or control over such account, including 
signatories, in order to verify the customer’s identity”). 
75. This due diligence is not specifically required by either the Bank Secrecy 
Act or the USA PATRIOT Act. See Mark E. Plotkin & B.J. Sanford, 
The Customer’s View of “Know Your Customer”—Section 326 of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, 1 Bloomberg Corp. L.J. 670, 677 (2006) 
(“[Customer Due Diligence] is not strictly required by Section 326 of the 
Patriot Act. Indeed, it is not mentioned in any law or regulation, but 
rather is imposed on banks by their regulators as part of the supervisory 
process.”). Regulators, however, believe that due diligence is required in 
order for financial institutions to satisfy the mandate to report suspi-
cious transactions. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (describing 
the suspicious activity reporting requirements); Fed. Fin. Inst. Exami-
nation Council, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering 
Examination Manual 63–65 (2010), http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_ 
infobase/documents/bsa_aml_man_2010.pdf [hereinafter BSA/AML 
Examination Manual] (tasking bank examiners with “[a]ssess[ing] the 
appropriateness and comprehensiveness of the bank’s customer due 
diligence policies, procedures, and processes for obtaining customer 
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“cash-intensive businesses”), financial institutions must know the 
purpose of each account, the source of funds in the account, and the 
customer’s primary trade area.76  
Armed with information about the normal business of each cus-
tomer, financial institutions are then tasked with identifying suspic-
ious transactions. The Bank Secrecy Act requires that financial 
institutions report illegal and suspicious activities to the federal 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).77 Institutions must 
file currency transaction reports for any transaction that involves 
more than $10,000 in cash.78 Financial institutions must also provide 
suspicious activity reports for transactions involving “at least $5,000 
in funds or other assets” if the bank knows, suspects, or has reason to 
suspect the following: 
(i) The transaction involves funds derived from illegal activities 
or is intended or conducted in order to hide or disguise funds or 
assets derived from illegal activities (including, without limita-
tion, the ownership, nature, source, location, or control of such 
funds or assets) as part of a plan to violate or evade any Fed-
eral law or regulation or to avoid any transaction reporting re-
quirement under Federal law or regulation; 
(ii) The transaction is designed to evade any requirements of 
this chapter or of any other regulations promulgated under the 
Bank Secrecy Act; or 
(iii) The transaction has no business or apparent lawful purpose 
or is not the sort in which the particular customer would norm-
ally be expected to engage, and the bank knows of no reason-
able explanation for the transaction after examining the avail-
able facts, including the background and possible purpose of the 
transaction.79 
Recent FinCEN guidance makes it clear that virtually every 
transaction conducted by a state-legal marijuana business “involve[s] 
funds derived from illegal activities” as described in the Bank Secrecy 
 
information and assess[ing] the value of this information in detecting, 
monitoring, and reporting suspicious activity”). 
76. BSA/AML Examination Manual, supra note 75, at 25, 65. 
77. “FinCEN, a bureau of the U.S. Treasury, is the delegated administrator 
of the [Bank Secrecy Act].” Id. at 9. FinCEN issues rules and regula-
tions interpreting the Act and “provid[es] investigative case support to 
law enforcement.” Id.  
78. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2014). 
79. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(a)(2). 
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Act regulations.80 Thus, banks must prepare suspicious activity re-
ports for most marijuana-related business transactions.81  
Run-of-the-mill marijuana-related transactions warrant only 
“Marijuana Limited” suspicious activity reports. These reports iden-
tify the parties involved, state that “the filing institution is filing the 
[report] solely because the subject is engaged in a marijuana-related 
business,” and represent that “no additional suspicious activity has 
been identified.”82  
However, FinCEN expects financial institutions to conduct due 
diligence to determine whether the marijuana-related transactions 
implicate any of the Department of Justice’s Controlled Substances 
Act enforcement priorities or state law.83 If an institution discovers 
transactions that might violate those priorities or state law, the 
institution must file a “Marijuana Priority” suspicious activity 
report.84 Recognizing that “a financial institution filing a [report] on a 
marijuana-related business may not always be well positioned to 
determine whether the business implicates one of the [Department of 
Justice] priorities or violates state law,” FinCEN provides a long, but 
not exhaustive, list of “red flags” that could indicate improper con-
duct.85  
 Among those red flags are the following: 
The business is unable to demonstrate that its revenue is de-
rived exclusively from the sale of marijuana in compliance with 
state law, as opposed to revenue derived from (i) the sale of 
other illicit drugs, (ii) the sale of marijuana not in compliance 
with state law, or (iii) other illegal activity.  
 
80. FinCEN Marijuana-Related Businesses Guidance, supra note 33, 
at 3 (“Because federal law prohibits the distribution and sale of mari-
juana, financial transactions involving a marijuana-related business 
would generally involve funds derived from illegal activity.”). 
81. Suspicious activity reports that identify only continuing activity of a 
previously filed report must be reported every ninety days. BSA/AML 
Examination Manual, supra note 75, at 76. 
82. FinCEN Marijuana-Related Businesses Guidance, supra note 33, 
at 4. Financial institutions should file continuing activity reports for as 
long as these routine transactions occur. Id. 
83. Id.; see supra note 58 and accompanying text (listing the Department of 
Justice enforcement priorities). 
84. FinCEN Marijuana-Related Businesses Guidance, supra note 33, 
at 4 (emphasizing that the report “should include comprehensive detail” 
including identifying information and addresses of involved parties, the 
dates and amounts of transactions, and the reason the institution 
believes a “Marijuana Priority” report is warranted). 
85. Id. at 4–5. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 3·2015 
Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism 
615 
A customer seeks to conceal or disguise involvement in 
marijuana-related business activity. For example, the customer 
may be using a business with a non-descript name (e.g., a 
“consulting,” “holding,” or “management” company) that pur-
ports to engage in commercial activity unrelated to marijuana, 
but is depositing cash that smells like marijuana.86 
Finally, a financial institution must provide a “marijuana termin-
ation” suspicious activity report when the institution determines “it 
necessary to terminate a relationship with a marijuana-related 
business in order to maintain an effective anti-money laundering 
compliance program.”87 When an institution learns that a terminated 
“marijuana-related business seeks to move to a second financial 
institution,” FinCEN encourages the first institution to voluntarily 
alert the second institution of its concerns.88  
FinCEN has authority to seek substantial civil money penalties 
from financial institutions and individuals who violate the Bank Sec-
recy Act.89 Such fines often reach well into the millions of dollars.90 
Federal officials also have an even bigger hammer: criminal prose-
cution.91  
For example, a person, including a bank employee, willfully 
violating the BSA or its implementing regulations is subject to a 
criminal fine of up to $250,000 or five years in prison, or both. 
A person who commits such a violation while violating another 
 
86. Id. at 5–6 (quoting bullet points exactly as found in FinCEN Mari-
juana-Related Businesses Guidance). 
87. Id. at 4–5 (stating that the institution’s report should “note in the 
narrative the basis for the termination”). 
88. Id. at 5. USA PATRIOT Act regulations provide a safe harbor from 
liability for institutions that share information about possible terrorist 
activity or money laundering. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.540 (2014).  
89. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(2) (2012) (granting authority to the Secretary of 
the Treasury); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.810(d) (2014) (delegating authority 
from the Secretary of the Treasury to FinCEN). 
90. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2014-1 (Dep’t of the 
Treasury, FinCEN Jan. 7, 2014), available at http://www.fincen.gov/ 
news_room/ea/files/JPMorgan_ASSESSMENT_01072014.pdf (consenting 
to the assessment of a $461 million civil penalty imposed by FinCEN for 
failing to report suspicious transactions associated with Bernard 
Madoff’s Ponzi investment scheme).  
91. 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012) (providing criminal penalties for persons and 
financial institutions that willfully violate the Bank Secrecy Act or its 
regulations); id. § 5324(d) (providing criminal penalties for those who 
help structure transactions to evade Bank Secrecy Act reporting 
requirements). 
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U.S. law, or engaging in a pattern of criminal activity, is subject 
to a fine of up to $500,000 or ten years in prison, or both.92  
Institutions face criminal money penalties of “not less than 2 times 
the amount of the transaction, but not more than $1,000,000.”93 
In connection with the FinCEN guidance, the Department of 
Justice issued guidance regarding marijuana-related financial crimes.94 
The Department reiterated its previous enforcement priorities, 
including preventing the sale of marijuana to minors and preventing 
the sale of marijuana in states where it is illegal under state law.95 
The new guidance stated that enforcement of marijuana-related finan-
cial crimes “should be subject to the same consideration and prior-
itization.”96 Thus, “if a financial institution or individual offers ser-
vices to a marijuana-related business whose activities do not implicate 
any of the eight priority factors, prosecution for [money-laundering] 
offenses may not be appropriate.”97 The guidance also warns that fi-
nancial institutions could face prosecution if their due diligence efforts 
fall short. 
For example, if a financial institution or individual provides 
banking services to a marijuana-related business knowing that 
the business is diverting marijuana from a state where 
marijuana sales are regulated to ones where such sales are illegal 
under state law, or is being used by a criminal organization to 
conduct financial transactions for its criminal goals, such as the 
concealment of funds derived from other illegal activity or the 
use of marijuana proceeds to support other illegal activity, 
prosecution for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957, 1960 or 
the BSA might be appropriate. Similarly, if the financial insti-
tution or individual is willfully blind to such activity by, for 
example, failing to conduct appropriate due diligence of the 
customers’ activities, such prosecution might be appropriate.98 
Like previous guidance, the memorandum further warns that the 
Department of Justice is not bound by the enforcement priorities and 
 
92. BSA/AML Examination Manual, supra note 75, at 14 (citing 31 
U.S.C. § 5322). 
93. 31 U.S.C. § 5322(d). 
94. Cole Marijuana Related Financial Crimes Memorandum, supra note 33. 
95. Id. at 1; see also supra note 58 and accompanying text (listing all eight 
Department of Justice enforcement priorities). 
96. Cole Marijuana Related Financial Crimes Memorandum, supra note 33, 
at 2. 
97. Id. at 2–3. 
98. Id. at 2. 
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can choose to investigate and prosecute anyone violating the money 
laundering laws.99  
In sum, a financial institution that knowingly processes trans-
actions for marijuana-related businesses commits the crime of money 
laundering. Even if financial institutions believe that prosecutorial 
discretion will spare them criminal penalties, the Bank Secrecy Act 
requires costly due diligence and reporting for all marijuana-related 
transactions. Ignoring Bank Secrecy Act obligations is a recipe for 
incurring civil and criminal penalties. 
C. Federal Deposit and Share Insurance 
The next tool of federal control in the banking system is the 
ubiquitous nature of federal deposit and share insurance. The vast 
majority of financial institutions, whether federal- or state-chartered, 
are federally insured. The Banking Act of 1933100 created the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation and required that all national banks 
obtain FDIC insurance. All states subsequently required that their 
state banks obtain FDIC insurance.101 The story is much the same for 
credit unions. In 1970, Congress created the National Credit Union 
Share Insurance Fund to insure the shares (essentially the deposits) of 
federal- and state-chartered credit unions. 102  Federal credit unions 
must be insured by the NCUA.103 Most states also require federal in-
 
99. Id. at 3 (“[N]othing [in the guidance] precludes investigation or prose-
cution, even in the absence of any one of the [enforcement priority] fac-
tors . . . in particular circumstances where investigation and prosecu-
tion otherwise serves an important federal interest.”). 
100. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.).  
101. Christine E. Blair & Rose M. Kushmeider, Challenges to the Dual Bank-
ing System: The Funding of Bank Supervision, 18 FDIC Banking 
Rev., no. 1, 2006 at 1, 3 n.3 (“While most states [quickly] required their 
banks to become federally insured, some states continued to charter 
banks without this requirement. Banks without federal deposit insurance 
continued to be supervised exclusively at the state level. After the sav-
ings and loan crises in Maryland and Ohio in the mid-1980s, when state-
sponsored deposit insurance systems collapsed, federal deposit insurance 
became a requirement for all state-chartered banks.”). 
102. Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-468, § 203(a), 84 Stat. 994, 999–
1000 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1783 (2012)). 
103. See 12 U.S.C. § 1781(a) (2012) (providing that the federal share insur-
ance “shall insure the member accounts of all Federal credit unions and 
it may insure the members accounts of (1) credit unions organized and 
operated according to the laws of any State, the District of Columbia, 
[and] the several territories . . . and (2) credit unions organized and 
operating under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense”). 
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surance for state-chartered credit unions, but a few states still allow 
their credit unions to purchase alternative private share insurance.104  
With the benefit of federal insurance comes the burden of federal 
regulation.105 In order to retain the federal insurance, financial institu-
tions must comply with FDIC or NCUA restrictions. To ensure state-
chartered banks and credit unions comply with federal regulations, 
the FDIC and NCUA conduct regular examinations.106  
Under the laws governing federal deposit and share insurance, 
financial institutions and related individuals face significant civil 
penalties for Bank Secrecy Act violations. FDIC and NCUA examina-
tions scrutinize financial institution compliance with the Act.107 The 
federal insurers can bring civil money penalty actions for Bank 
Secrecy Act violations.108 Federal insurers can also impose the “death-
 
104. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.  
105. See Weir v. United States, 92 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1937) (stating that the 
federal government can impose conditions applicable to institutions that 
receive federal deposit insurance); George H. Brown, Financial Institu-
tion Lawyers as Quasi-Public Enforcers, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 637, 
676–77 (1994) (“By agreeing to participate in the federal deposit 
insurance scheme, the institution gains access to a vast supply of low-
cost capital for itself in the form of government guaranteed deposits. In 
exchange for this enormous benefit, the institution and its directors and 
officers become bound by the laws, regulations, and policies imposed by 
law . . . .”). 
106. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1820(b), 1784 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 741.1 (2014). The FDIC 
serves as the primary federal regulator (and examiner) for state-
chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. 
Who Is the FDIC?, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/
WhoistheFDIC.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). The Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve is the primary federal regulator for state-
chartered banks that have elected to be members of the Federal Reserve 
System. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The 
Federal Reserve System: Purposes & Functions 59–60 (9th ed. 
2005). The National Credit Union Administration is the primary federal 
regulator for federally insured credit unions. Frequently Asked Quest-
ions, NCUA, http://www.ncua.gov/Resources/Cnsmrs/Pages/FAQ.asp
x (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (“All federal credit unions and state credit 
unions that are federally insured must report to us. Some non-federally 
insured credit unions also report to NCUA at the request of their state 
regulator.”). 
107. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(s)(2), 1786(q) (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.810(b) 
(2014); see also BSA/AML Examination Manual, supra note 75, at 9 
(“FinCEN relies on the federal banking agencies to examine banks 
within their respective jurisdictions for compliance with the [Bank 
Secrecy Act].”). The Federal Reserve examines state-chartered banks 
that are members of the Federal Reserve System for Bank Secrecy Act 
compliance. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
108. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (granting authority to the “appropriate Federal 
banking agency”); id. § 1786(k) (granting authority to the NCUA for 
credit unions); see, e.g., TCF Nat’l Bank, AA-EC-2012-155 (Dep’t of 
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penalty”—revocation of deposit insurance—effectively forcing the 
closure of any institution that is required to have federal insurance.109 
Finally, insured financial institution employees who violate money 
laundering laws or the Bank Secrecy Act face regulatory suspension or 
prohibition from the banking industry.110  
Federal deposit insurance does more than provide federal regula-
tors an additional avenue for enforcing already applicable federal laws 
(like the Bank Secrecy Act). Deposit insurance gives the federal 
insurers authority and motivation to manage risks that could result in 
losses for the federal insurance funds.  
Increasingly the FDIC has become concerned about the risk, in-
cluding the reputational risk111 associated with payment processing.112 
For a time, the FDIC provided a non-exhaustive list of “high-risk” 
 
the Treasury, Comptroller of the Currency, Jan. 25, 2013), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2013/nr-occ-2013-
18a.pdf (order consenting to the assessment of a $10 million civil 
penalty for filing late suspicious activity reports and failing to maintain 
an adequate anti–money laundering policy). 
109. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2) (providing that the FDIC Board may terminate 
deposit insurance for a bank if the “depository institution or the 
directors or trustees of the insured institution have violated any applic-
able law, regulation, order, condition imposed in writing by the [FDIC] 
in connection with the approval of any application or other request by 
the insured depository institution, or written agreement entered into 
between the insured depository institution and the [FDIC]”); id. § 1786 
(providing that the NCUA Board may terminate share insurance for a 
credit union that “is violating or has violated an applicable law, rule, 
regulation, order, or any condition imposed in writing by the Board”); 
see also Ernest L. Simons IV, Comment, Anti-Money Laundering 
Compliance: Only Mega Banks Need Apply, 17 N.C. Banking Inst. 
249, 259 (2013) (“In November of 2012, First Bank of Delaware lost its 
charter (the so-called ‘Death Penalty’) for its [anti–money laundering] 
failures.”). 
110. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(2); see also BSA/AML Examination Manual, 
supra note 75, at 14 (“[I]ndividuals may be removed from banking [for 
Bank Secrecy Act violations], as long as the violation was not 
inadvertent or unintentional.”). 
111. “Reputation risk is the risk arising from negative public opinion.” 
FDIC, Financial Institution Letter No. 44-2008, Guidance for 
Managing Third-Party Risk 3 (2008), http://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/financial/2008/fil08044a.pdf.  
112. Id.; FDIC, Financial Institution Letter No. 3-2012, Payment 
Processor Relationships 1 (2012), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news
/financial/2012/fil12003.pdf; FDIC, Financial Institution Letter 
No. 43-2013, FDIC Supervisory Approach to Payment Process-
ing Relationships with Merchant Customers That En-
gage in Higher-Risk Activities (2013), http://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/financial/2013/fil13043.pdf. 
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businesses requiring additional due diligence. 113  While the FDIC’s 
high-risk list did not specifically mention the marijuana industry, it 
did identify unlawful Internet gambling and tobacco sales as risky.114 
If those industries present reputational risk, it seems likely the state-
legal marijuana industry does as well. After the FDIC’s high-risk list 
attracted complaints that it unfairly targeted lawful businesses, the 
FDIC eliminated the list.115 The FDIC, however, reiterated that banks 
need to “properly manage customer relationships.”116  
According to the FDIC, insured banks should focus their due 
diligence not only on bank customers but also on third-party payment 
processors who provide services to businesses. “Financial institutions 
that fail to adequately manage these relationships may be viewed as 
facilitating a payment processor’s or merchant client’s . . . unlawful 
activity and, thus, may be liable for such acts or practices.”117 In 
other words, an insured bank must not only know its customers; it 
must also know the customers of its customers. 
What exactly should the due diligence entail? The FDIC provides 
few specifics but warns that “[f]inancial institutions need to assure 
themselves that they are not facilitating fraudulent or other illegal 
activity.”118 Reports suggest that rather than attempt to meet the 
FDIC’s stringent but opaque standard, some financial institutions are 
closing accounts for high-risk businesses, including third-party 
payment processors, payday lenders, gun and ammunition retailers, 
 
113. FDIC, Managing Risks in Third-Party Payment Processor Relation-
ships, Supervisory Insights, Summer 2011, at 6. 
114. Id. 
115. See Rob Blackwell, Takeaways from the “Hit List” Withdrawal, Am. 
Banker, July 29, 2014, at 1.  
116. FDIC, Financial Institution Letter No. 41-2014, Clarifying 
Supervisory Approach to Institutions Establishing Account 
Relationships with Third-Party Payment Processors (2014), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2014/fil14041.html (“In fact, 
it is the FDIC’s policy that insured institutions that properly manage 
customer relationships are neither prohibited nor discouraged from 
providing services to customers operating in compliance with applicable 
federal and state law.”). Even though the FDIC no longer provides an 
official list of high-risk businesses, it seems likely that it and other 
regulators will subject some customer relationships, including those with 
state-legal marijuana businesses, to additional scrutiny. 
117. FDIC, Financial Institution Letter No. 3-2012, Payment Pro-
cessor Relationships 2 (2012), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/fina
ncial/2012/fil12003.pdf (emphasis omitted). 
118. FDIC, Financial Institution Letter No. 43-2013, FDIC 
Supervisory Approach to Payment Processing Relationships 
with Merchant Customers That Engage in Higher-Risk 
Activities 1 (2013), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2013
/fil13043.pdf.  
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and the adult entertainment industry.119 If insured banks cannot meet 
the FDIC’s regulatory due diligence requirements for these industries 
(which may or may not involve fraudulent or illegal conduct), it 
seems unlikely that they will meet the FDIC’s regulatory hurdles for 
the marijuana industry (which clearly violates federal criminal law).120 
 
119. See, e.g., Staff of H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 
113th Cong., The Department of Justice’s “Operation Choke 
Point”: Illegally Choking Off Legitimate Businesses? 2, 6–7 
(Comm. Print 2014), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/05/Staff-Report-Operation-Choke-Point1.pdf [hereinafter House 
Operation Choke Point Report] (noting that accounts had been 
closed due to “heightened scrutiny required by our regulators” and “cur-
rent regulatory trends affecting your industry”).  
 In conjunction with the FDIC’s increased interest in third-party 
payment processing, the Department of Justice implemented “Operation 
Choke Point”—a series of investigations into insured banks under the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(FIRREA). See Memorandum from Michael S. Blume, Dir. Consumer 
Protection Branch, Dep’t of Justice, to Stuart F. Delery, Ass’t Att’y 
Gen., Civ. Div., Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 9, 2013), available at http:// 
oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Appendix-1-of-2.pdf 
(HOGR-3PPP000329). FIRREA allows the U.S. Attorney General to 
seek civil penalties from entities and individuals that have committed 
fraud “affecting a federally insured financial institution.” Id. (citing 12 
U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2) (2012)). These investigations may also have led 
banks to close accounts for some high-risk businesses. House Opera-
tion Choke Point Report, supra. 
120. The Department of Justice’s position on bank processing of state-legal 
marijuana transactions under Operation Choke Point is less clear. 
FIRREA, the basis for Operation Choke Point, does not apply to trans-
actions violating the Controlled Substances Act or money laundering 
laws. FIRREA applies to “fraudulent” transactions “affecting” insured 
financial institutions. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (2012). Marijuana transact-
ions violate federal law but are not typically fraudulent. Critics have 
suggested that the Obama Administration might, therefore, be more 
lenient to banks that process marijuana transactions than it is to banks 
that process transactions for completely legal businesses. See William M. 
Isaac, DOJ’s “Operation Choke Point”: An Attack on Market Economy, 
Am. Banker (Mar. 21, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.americanbanker. 
com/bankthink/dojs-operation-choke-point-an-attack-on-market-econom 
y-1066421-1.html (“Ironically, at the same time, government is making 
life miserable for businesses seeking to meet consumer needs for emerg-
ency funds it is encouraging banks to offer services to marijuana dealers. 
While marijuana sales are authorized in a few states, it remains a felony 
in most states and under federal law.”); House Operation Choke 
Point Report, supra note 119, at 2–3 (“[A]t the same time the 
Administration is pressuring banks to terminate relationships with legal 
industries, it is providing formal guidance to banks on how to provide 
financial services to the marijuana industry.”). Others believe the 
marijuana industry also risks being swept up in Operation Choke Point 
enforcement. See Andrew Langer, Obama’s Operation Choke Point and 
the New American Legal System, Daily Caller (May 13, 2014, 5:06 
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Like the FDIC, the NCUA focuses its examination of insured cre-
dit unions on risk, including reputational risk.121 However, the NCUA 
has not identified “high-risk” industries. Moreover, the NCUA does 
not pursue enforcement actions based solely on reputational risk.122 
Indeed, some reports suggest that the NCUA may welcome credit 
union participation in the payday lending market—a market that the 
FDIC believes warrants extra scrutiny.123 Thus, it is possible that the 
NCUA would take a more favorable view of state-legal marijuana 
business than the FDIC.  
Even if the NCUA views the marijuana industry favorably, credit 
unions may not be able to service the entire state-legal marijuana 
industry. Insured credit unions may generally only provide services to 
“members.”124 Members of nationally chartered credit unions must 
have a “common bond.”125 Many states also place limitations on credit 
union membership.126 In addition, federally insured credit unions face 
 
PM), http://dailycaller.com/2014/05/13/obamas-operation-choke-point-
and-the-new-american-legal-system/ (“If Operation Choke Point stands, 
there is nothing to prevent the targeting of legal dispensaries and 
growing operations having their bank accounts canceled or payment 
processing shut down.”).  
121. See NCUA, Examiner’s Guide 1-5 to 1-8 (2004); Letter from Debbie 
Matz, Chairman, NCUA, to Jeb Hensarling, Chairman, House Comm. 
on Fin. Sercs. (June 12, 2014), available at http://www.nafcu.org/ 
News/2014_News/June/Matz-Hensarlingreputationalriskreply/ [hereinafter 
Matz Reputational Risk Letter] (stating that the “NCUA does consider 
reputation risk along with six additional key risks in its supervision of 
federally insured credit unions”). 
122. Matz Reputational Risk Letter, supra note 121 (“NCUA neither pursues 
enforcement nor otherwise takes action against supervised federally 
insured credit unions based on reputation risk alone. However, NCUA 
duly considers the impact reputation risk may have on the CAMEL 
ratings in concert with the six other risk factors.”). 
123. Rachel Witkowski, Bank, Credit Union Regulators Split Over Payday 
Loan Products, Am. Banker, May 2, 2014, at 1; see also Matz 
Reputational Risk Letter, supra note 121 (stating that the “NCUA does 
not force an institution to change its business practices simply on a 
reputation risk matter”). 
124. 12 C.F.R. § 741.3(e) (2014). 
125. 12 U.S.C. § 1759(b) (2012). 
126. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 5-17-5 (2014) (“Credit union organization 
shall be limited to groups, of both large and small membership, having 
a common bond of occupation or association or to groups within a 
well-defined neighborhood, community or rural district.”). State-
chartered credit unions without any common bond of membership risk 
their federal exemption from income tax under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(14) 
(2012). La Caisse Populaire Ste. Marie v. United States, 563 F.2d 505 
(1st Cir. 1977). 
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restrictions on business lending. 127  These limitations may prevent 
some marijuana-related businesses from accessing credit union 
services.  
Of course, state-chartered credit unions with private insurance 
escape NCUA regulation. The NCUA does not examine these 
institutions, and NCUA regulations are not binding on them. 128 
However, only nine states currently have privately insured credit 
unions,129 and there are only about 150 non–federally insured state-
chartered credit unions total.130 Of the states allowing some marijuana 
use, only California, Illinois, Maryland, and Nevada have privately 
insured state-chartered credit unions. Even in these states, it is not 
clear that a private insurer would be willing to insure an institution 
with marijuana business. Providing insurance might subject the 
 
127. See 12 U.S.C. § 1757a (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 723.16(a) (2014) (restricting 
the total amount of business loans a credit union can make to “the 
lesser of 1.75 times the credit union’s net worth or 12.25% of the credit 
union’s total assets”).  
128. Efforts to Ensure Compliance and Enforcement of the Bank Secrecy 
Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 
108th Cong. 77 (2004) (prepared statement of JoAnn M. Johnson, 
Chairman, NCUA) (stating that the “NCUA does not review 
examinations of privately insured credit unions and does not have 
enforcement authority for BSA compliance in those credit unions”).  
129. Alabama, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Nevada, Ohio, 
and Texas. Ala. Code § 5-17-19(b) (2014); Cal. Fin. Code § 16004 
(Supp. 2014); Idaho Code Ann. § 26-2153(1) (2014); 205 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 305/58 (2007); Ind. Code § 28-7-1-31.5(a) (West 2010); Md. 
Code Ann. Fin. Inst. § 6-701(a) (West 2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 678.750(3) (Lexis-Nexis 2014); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1733.041 
(West 2009); Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 15.410 (West 2013); 7 Tex. 
Admin. Code § 95.101 (2014); Disclosures for Non-Federally Insured 
Depository Institutions Under FDICIA, 70 Fed. Reg. 12,823, 12,823 
(proposed Mar. 16, 2005). The remaining states either require federal 
insurance or simply do not have any privately insured credit unions. See 
U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-03-971, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act: FTC Best Among Candidates to Enforce Con-
sumer Protection Provisions 7 (2003). Currently, the only private 
insurer is American Share Insurance. Stephanie O. Crofton et al., Amer-
ican Share Insurance: The Sole Surviving Private Deposit Insurer in the 
United States, 28 Essays in Econ. & Bus. Hist. 27 (2010). 
130. See Ed Roberts, ASI-Insured to Pay 7.5 BP Premium, Credit Union 
J., Sept. 15, 2013, at 3 (reporting that American Share Insurance 
“provide[d] primary insurance (up to $250,000 per account) for 120 
state-chartered credit unions”); Ray Birch, Recent Converts to ASI Say 
Choice Remains a Wise One, Credit Union J., Jan. 18, 2010, at 1 
(reporting that 155 credit unions had private primary share insurance); 
see also NCUA, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.ncua.gov/ 
Resources/Cnsmrs/Pages/FAQ.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (“There 
are currently fewer than 500 non-federally insured state chartered credit 
unions.”).  
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insurer to punishment under the Controlled Substances Act or anti–
money laundering laws. 
Nevertheless, one group of financial institution organizers is 
betting that a credit union charter is the path to marijuana financial 
services. In November 2014, organizers convinced Colorado regulators 
to grant Fourth Corner Credit Union a state charter.131 Marijuana 
businesses are specifically included as part of Fourth Corner’s field of 
membership.132 Fourth Corner Credit Union has also applied to the 
NCUA for share insurance. If the NCUA refuses to issue share 
insurance, Fourth Corner’s organizers plan to request that Colorado 
consider chartering a credit union with private share insurance.133 
Assuming Fourth Corner can clear other regulatory hurdles,134 Colo-
rado might even allow the credit union to open before it gets in-
surance.135  
 
131. David Migoya, Overlooked Colorado Law Opened Door, Denver Post, 
Nov. 24, 2014, at 1A. 
132. Id. (“Any cannabis-related business can be a member, as well as anyone 
who is a member of a nonprofit group that supports legalized 
marijuana.”). 
133. David Migoya, Colorado Pot Credit Union Might Get State Approval If 
Feds Deny Insurance, Fourth Corner May Operate in the Private 
Sector, Denver Post, Dec. 1, 2014, at 1A. Colorado allows credit 
unions with federal share insurance “or comparable insurance approved 
by the commissioner.” Id. (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-30-117.5 
(2014)). In 2003, Colorado’s Financial Services Commissioner issued an 
opinion stating that no private share insurance was comparable because 
the NCUA had “much greater borrowing authority to cover the liquidity 
needs of its insured credit unions.” Id. Fourth Corner would likely have 
to convince the current commissioner to rethink this policy—at least 
with respect to those credit unions unable to secure federal insurance. 
Id. Fourth Corner has mentioned Lloyd’s of London as a possible in-
surer. Matt Richtel, The First Bank of Bud, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2015, 
at BU1.   
134. Before Fourth Corner Credit Union can open, the Federal Reserve must 
grant it access to its payment system. See David Migoya, Marijuana 
Business Owners Have No Dock to Bank Cash, Denver Post, Dec. 28, 
2014, at 20W (“‘No financial institution can transact business unless 
they have [sic] access to the Federal Reserve System,’ said Chris 
Mykelbust, . . . [Colorado’s] commissioner of financial services . . . .”). 
Part I.F of this Article discusses the Federal Reserve’s control over 
payment systems and Fourth Corner’s application for access.  
135. Aaron Passman, New “Pot CU” Could Open Doors Without Insurance, 
Credit Union J., Dec. 15, 2014, at 1 (“A loophole in Colorado’s law 
allows credit unions to open as long as they have applied for insurance, 
even if it hasn’t been approved . . . .”); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-30-
117.5(3) (2014) (“No credit union shall be granted a charter by the 
commissioner unless such credit union has applied for insurance on its 
shares and deposits as provided in this section.”(emphasis added)). 
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At any rate, Fourth Corner’s NCUA share insurance application 
may be a bellwether: if it succeeds in getting federal share insurance, 
that may be a reliable sign that share and deposit insurance regula-
tors will not punish financial institutions who serve the marijuana 
industry. For now though, the vast majority of financial institutions 
are governed by federal deposit or share insurance regulations that 
discourage service to the marijuana industry. 
D. Federal Reserve Regulation of Member Banks 
Just as state-chartered financial institutions subject themselves to 
federal regulation by using federal deposit or share insurance, state 
banks subject themselves to federal regulation if they choose to 
become members of the Federal Reserve System. All state-chartered 
banks (but not credit unions) are eligible to apply for Federal Reserve 
membership.136 In order to become a member of the Federal Reserve 
System, a state-chartered bank must make an application137 and must 
purchase stock in its regional Federal Reserve Bank.138 There are 
currently 850 state member banks.139  
Once a state bank becomes a member of the Federal Reserve, it 
must comply with federal laws governing member banks and regula-
tions established by the Federal Reserve.140 A Federal Reserve mem-
ber bank must “at all times conduct its business and exercise its 
powers with due regard to safety and soundness.”141 In order to meet 
this safety and soundness requirement, a member bank must monitor 
“[c]ompliance with applicable laws and regulations.”142  
 
136. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (2012) (“Any bank incorporated by special law of any 
State, . . . or organized under the general laws of any State or of the 
United States, including Morris Plan banks and other incorporated 
banking institutions engaged in similar business, desiring to become a 
member of the Federal Reserve System, may make application to the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System . . . .”); see also 
12 C.F.R. §§ 208.2(f),  208.3(a) (2014). National banks are required to 
become members of the Federal Reserve. 12 U.S.C. § 222 (2012).  
137. In deciding on applications, the Federal Reserve must “consider the fin-
ancial condition of the applying bank, the general character of its man-
agement, and whether or not the corporate powers exercised are consist-
ent with the purposes of [law creating the Federal Reserve System].” 
12 U.S.C. § 322 (2012); see also 12 C.F.R. § 208.3 (2014). 
138. 12 U.S.C. §§ 321, 323 (2012). 
139. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 100th Annual 
Report 46 (2013) (“At the end of 2013, 2,003 banks (excluding 
nondepository trust companies and private banks) were members of the 
Federal Reserve System, of which 850 were state chartered.”). 
140. 12 U.S.C. §§ 324, 330 (2012). 
141. 12 C.F.R. § 208.3(d). 
142. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. D-1 § II.A.5 (2014). 
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The Federal Reserve regularly examines state member banks.143 
Among other things, the examination evaluates a bank’s risk 
management practices and compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act.144 
The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Bank Examination Manual in-
structs examiners to evaluate each state member bank’s operations to 
ensure that the bank does not provide deposit or loan services to 
illegal enterprises. The Manual explains that a bank “should perform 
its due diligence by adequately and reasonably ascertaining and 
documenting that the funds of its . . . customers were derived from 
legitimate means.”145 It further explains that “if accounts at U.S. 
banking entities are used for illegal purposes, the entities could be 
exposed to reputational risk and risk of financial loss as a result of 
asset seizures and forfeitures.”146 In addition, banks are warned that 
loans should only be provided “for legitimate purposes” and that loan 
collateral “derived from illegal activities . . . is subject to forfeiture 
through the seizure of assets by a government agency.”147 
Unsurprisingly, the Federal Reserve’s Commercial Bank Manual 
does not specifically address customer activities that are illegal under 
federal law but allowed under state law. Yet it is clear that the 
Federal Reserve, under its duty to enforce the Bank Secrecy Act and 
regulate member bank risk, has ample authority to impose civil 
penalties on state member banks that do business with the marijuana 
industry. 
E. Federal Bank Holding Company Regulation 
Next, the federal government regulates all bank holding com-
panies. A bank holding company is simply a corporation that controls 
at least one bank.148 Banks of all sizes choose a holding company 
structure for a variety of business and tax reasons.149 Today about 80 
 
143. 12 U.S.C. § 325 (2012). 
144. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.810(b)(2) (2014). 
145. Div. of Banking Supervision & Regulation, Bd. of Governors 
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Commercial Bank Examination  
Manual § 4128.1, at 10 (2014). 
146. Id. at 12.  
147. Id. at 10.  
148. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012). 
149. See Joseph M. Ford, One-Bank Holding Companies for Community 
Banks, 14 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 739, 743 (1983); Donald M. Brown, The 
Effect of State Banking Laws on Holding Company Banks, Fed. 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Rev., Aug./Sept. 1983, at 26. Because 
credit unions are owned cooperatively, they do not utilize holding  
company structures.  
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percent of banks are controlled by holding companies.150 At the end of 
2013, banks controlled by holding companies “held approximately 99 
percent of all insured commercial bank assets in the United States.”151 
The federal government began regulating bank holding companies 
in earnest with the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.152 Under the 
Act as amended, the Federal Reserve has broad regulatory authority 
over bank holding companies and their non-bank subsidiaries.153 As it 
does with member banks, the Federal Reserve scrutinizes bank hold-
ing company risk management.154 “Organizations supervised by the 
Federal Reserve, regardless of size and complexity, should have 
effective compliance risk-management programs that are appropriately 
tailored to the organizations’ risk profiles.”155 The Federal Reserve 
warns that “larger, more complex banking organizations” require 
“firmwide compliance risk management” that includes comprehensive 
anti–money laundering policies.156 The Federal Reserve also has au-
thority to take enforcement actions and assess civil penalties against 
bank holding companies and related parties. 157  Thus, the Federal 
Reserve has the power to shut off the marijuana industry’s access to 
not only member banks but also to other non-bank financial 
companies owned by a bank holding company. 
F. Federal Payment Systems Administration 
The federal government also wields significant control over pay-
ment systems. The Federal Reserve provides four important payment 
services: (1) a centralized check collection system, (2) the Automated 
Clearinghouse (ACH) network for processing batched electronic small-
 
150. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 100th Annual 
Report 281 (2013). 
151. Id. at 47. 
152. Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 1841–50 (2012)); see also Ford, supra note 149, at 741 (“Federal  
regulation of bank holding companies was limited and ineffective until 
Congress adopted the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.”). 
153. 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (2012). 
154. See, e.g., id. § 1844(c)(2) (authorizing the Federal Reserve to “make 
examinations of a bank holding company and each subsidiary of a bank 
holding company in order to . . . inform the Board of . . . the  
financial, operational, and other risks within the bank holding company 
system”). 
155. Div. of Banking Supervision & Regulation, Bd. of Governors 
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Bank Holding Company Supervision 
Manual § 2124.07.1.1 (2015).  
156. Id. 
157. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818, 1847 (2012).  
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dollar payments, (3) the Fedwire system for larger electronic 
payments, and (4) coin and currency services.158  
Financial institutions use each of these systems to provide 
customers payment services. The Monetary Control Act of 1980 
requires that the Federal Reserve offer payment system services to all 
“depository institutions,” regardless of whether the institution is a 
member of the Federal Reserve System.159 Thus, the Federal Reserve 
currently provides services to banks and credit unions alike.160 By 
establishing regulations and policies governing access to its payment 
systems, the Federal Reserve has the ability to impact practices at all 
financial institutions using these systems. 
Accessing the Federal Reserve’s payment systems is not 
administratively difficult. It requires only a resolution from the finan-
cial institution’s board of directions and the completion of forms 
designating individuals authorized to initiate transactions and identi-
fying the types of services wanted.161 Under normal circumstances, 
once a financial institution receives a charter, the Federal Reserve 
 
158. What Is the Advantage of Putting Your Money in a Fed Member Bank 
Versus a Bank That Is a Nonmember? How Do You Know Which 
Banks Are Fed Members?, Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F. (Oct. 2003), 
http://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2003/october/
member-nonmember-banks; see also Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve, Policies: The Federal Reserve in the Payments 
System (1990) [hereinafter The Federal Reserve in the Payments 
System]. 
159. 12 U.S.C. § 248a (2012) (requiring that the Federal Reserve provide a 
single fee schedule for providing payment systems services to member 
and non-member depository institutions); id. § 461(b)(1)(A) (defining 
depository institution to include “any insured bank . . . or any bank 
which is eligible to make application to become an insured bank” and 
“any insured credit union . . . or any credit union which is eligible to 
make application to become an insured credit union”). 
160. See Fed. Reserve Bank Servs., Federal Reserve Operating Cir-
cular 1: Account Relationships § 2.2 (Feb. 1, 2013), 
http://www.frbservices.org/files/regulations/pdf/operating_circular_1_
02012013.pdf [hereinafter Fed. Circular 1] (describing the types of 
financial institutions that can maintain an account with a Federal 
Reserve Bank and access Federal Reserve payment services); The 
Federal Reserve in the Payments System, supra note 158 (“Since 
implementation of [The Monetary Control Act of 1980], the Reserve 
Banks have provided access to Federal Reserve services to nonmember 
banks, mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, and credit 
unions.”). 
161. See Fed. Reserve Bank Servs., Federal Reserve Account 
Management Guide I-3 (Apr. 2014), http://www.frbservices.org/file
s/regulations/pdf/amg_0414.pdf; New Financial Services Customer—
Setup Service or Access, Fed. Res. Bank Servs. http://www.frbser 
vices.org/servicesetup/new_customer_setup.html (last visited Jan. 21, 
2015). 
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grants the institution a “master account” and access to payment 
services.162 This process makes sense because the prospective financial 
institution has already been vetted by the chartering authority, and 
usually by the deposit or share insurer as well. 
Of course, nothing prevents the Federal Reserve from adjusting 
the terms and conditions for use of the Federal Reserve’s payment 
systems. It is possible that future terms and conditions could cut off 
access to financial institutions that provide services to the marijuana 
industry.163  
One group of credit union organizers is learning firsthand that the 
Federal Reserve can prevent marijuana banking by limiting access to 
payment systems. As explained in Part I.C, Colorado has granted 
Fourth Corner Credit Union a charter to open a credit union focused 
on the marijuana industry.164 Fourth Corner, however, is not currently 
operating because it has been unable to get access to the Federal 
Reserve’s payment systems. 165  Fourth Corner requested a master 
account in 2014.166 Rather than access, “the credit union organizers 
got a letter from Esther George, president of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City. The letter stated that issuance of a master 
account was ‘within the Reserve Bank’s discretion’ and required the 
Fed to identify the risks ‘posed by such a financial institution.’”167 
Months later Fourth Corner is still waiting for a decision.168 It is 
possible that the decision will ultimately come not from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, but from the Board of Governors of the 
 
162. See Richtel, supra note 133 (noting that “granting of a master account 
by the Federal Reserve had usually been routine” and that Federal 
Reserve approval “comes in days”); David Migoya, Denver Pot Credit 
Union Awaits Approval, Denver Post, Dec. 12, 2014, at 17A (“Any 
credit union or bank needs a Federal Reserve master account to operate. 
Approval is typically procedural once a business has a valid charter and 
routing numbers.”).  
163. For example, the National Automated Clearing House Association 
(NACHA) Rules—private rules governing financial institutions that use 
the ACH network—require that each originating depository financial 
institution have a contract with each customer originating payment. In 
that contract, the customer must “agree not to originate Entries that 
violate the laws of the United States.” Nat’l Automated Clearing 
House Ass’n, NACHA Operating Rules & Guidelines § 2.2.2.1(c) 
(2014). It is possible that the Federal Reserve could choose to add a 
similar requirement for accessing the ACH system.  
164. See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text. 
165. David Migoya, Sen. Bennet Urges Fed to Move on Pot Bank Case, 
Denver Post, Mar. 10, 2015, at 9A.   
166. Migoya, supra note 131; Migoya, supra note 162. 
167.  Richtel, supra note 133.   
168. Migoya, supra note 165. 
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Federal Reserve in Washington, D.C.169 The Board may be coordinat-
ing with the NCUA as the NCUA considers Fourth Corner’s appli-
cation for share insurance.170 Currently, the outcome is far from cer-
tain.171 At a minimum, Fourth Corner’s experience shows the Federal 
Reserve’s control over its payment systems access gives it significant 
regulatory power. 
G. Limited State Control 
As the preceding parts explain, federal drug and anti–money 
laundering laws criminalize knowing efforts to bank state-legal 
marijuana businesses. In addition, federal laws aimed to prevent 
money laundering, protect the federal insurance funds, and manage 
risk give federal regulators power to punish (and close) both federal- 
and state-chartered financial institutions. States have no legislative or 
administrative authority to prevent federal authorities from enforcing 
federal law. 
States regulators can reassure financial institutions that state 
regulators will allow banks to service the marijuana industry,172 but 
the state regulators cannot speak for federal regulators. State 
regulators recognize the federal government’s power. When asked 
about banks and marijuana, Scott Jarvis, director of Washington’s 
Department of Financial Institutions, noted that “[s]o much is in the 
hands of our federal counterparts.”173 He explained that Washington 
state financial regulators do not provide advice to banks regarding 
marijuana businesses. “We’re not telling them ‘no.’ We’re not telling 
 
169 . David Migoya, Pot Bank Decision Appears Headed to Fed Board, 
Denver Post, Feb. 22, 2015, at 1K.  
170.  See Migoya, supra note 165 (“Although Fourth Corner has a Colorado 
charter to operate, it cannot formally open its doors until it has the 
master account, which in part hinges on deposit insurance by the 
National Credit Union Administration, which is also pending.”).  
171. In another context, commentators have expressed skepticism that the 
Federal Reserve will grant payment system services to financial 
institutions aimed primarily at servicing the marijuana industry. See 
infra note 220. After all, processing payments for marijuana business 
violates criminal conspiracy and anti–money laundering laws. See supra 
notes 52–56, 63–66, and accompanying text.  
172.  Steve Daniels, Banks Reluctant to Bankroll Pot Biz, Crain’s Chi. Bus., 
Mar. 23, 2015, at 26 (“‘We are telling banks that it is a business 
decision on their part but that our examiners will not criticize a bank if 
they choose to provide financial services to medical cannabis providers,’ 
a spokesman for the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional 
Regulation [said] in an email.”).  
173. Jerry Cornfield, Banks Willing to Serve Pot Industry, But Not Able, 
Daily Herald (Everett, Wash.) (Oct. 28, 2013), 
http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20131028/BIZ/710289959/Financial-
centers-willing-but-not-able-to-serve-pot-industry. 
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them ‘yes.’” 174  Instead, the Washington Department of Financial 
Institutions issued a statement to banks considering marijuana 
business customers. The statement recommended hiring “independent 
legal counsel” and having counsel explain “the difference between a 
law and a policy of prosecutorial discretion (or priority-setting) 
related to enforcement of a law.”175 
II. Attempts to Bank the Marijuana Industry 
Notwithstanding the clarity of federal criminal law and the 
pervasiveness of federal banking regulation, both the federal and state 
governments are experimenting with measures to facilitate marijuana 
banking. So far efforts have been incremental; they have not made 
major changes to federal criminal or banking laws. At the federal 
level, the Department of Justice and FinCEN have issued guidance 
explaining current enforcement priorities. At the state level, Colorado 
has passed legislation authorizing the creation of a financial 
cooperative to provide banking services to the state-legal marijuana 
industry. Neither of these measures addresses the core concern for 
banks: at any time federal law enforcement and regulators may 
change their guidance and punish financial institutions for past 
practices. 
A. Federal Guidance 
As explained in Part I, federal law is clear: it is illegal to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense marijuana, or to knowingly 
provide banking services to those who do.176 However, as states began 
to legalize marijuana and the state-legal marijuana industry began to 
flourish, the industry began to experience banking problems. States 
that had legalized marijuana clamored for federal authorities to 
address the issue.177  
 
174. Id; see also Robert Barba, Former Colorado Bank Regulator Discusses 
Dodd-Frank, Pot, Bitcoin, Am. Banker, Jan. 3, 2014, at 4 (reporting 
that Fred Joseph, who served as Colorado’s Banking and Securities 
Commissioner from 2011 until 2014, believes that “as long as the specter 
is there at the federal level,” he would “be shocked if banks want to 
take” marijuana industry accounts). 
175. Wash. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., Providing Banking Services to 
Marijuana Related Businesses Under I-502 1 (2d ed. 2014), 
http://www.dfi.wa.gov/documents/banks/marijuana-faqs.pdf (emphasis 
omitted). 
176. See supra Parts I.A and I.B. 
177. See Ed Roberts, Governors Ask NCUA, Bank Regulators for Guidance 
on Pot, Credit Union J., Oct. 3, 2013, at 1; Kevin Wack, Regulators 
Pressed to Act on Marijuana Business, Credit Union J., Dec. 23, 
2013, at 1. 
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Recognizing their limited enforcement resources, the Department 
of Justice and FinCEN issued guidance addressing marijuana 
banking.178 As previously explained, the FinCEN guidance describes 
when financial institutions should file “Marijuana Limited,” 
“Marijuana Priority,” and “Marijuana Termination” suspicious activ-
ity reports.179 According to FinCEN, the guidance was intended to 
“enhance the availability of financial services for, and the financial 
transparency of, marijuana-related businesses.”180 The Department of 
Justice guidance explains its marijuana enforcement priorities and 
suggests that banks may not face criminal prosecution if they only 
service state-legal marijuana businesses.181 
Financial institutions’ response to the guidance was tepid. 
According to Don Childears, president and CEO of the Colorado 
Bankers Association, the guidance did little to facilitate marijuana 
industry banking. “At best, [it] amounts to ‘Serve these customers at 
your own risk’ and it emphasizes all those risks.”182 The American 
Bankers Association agreed: “‘[The] guidance . . . doesn’t alter the 
underlying challenge for banks. . . . As it stands, possession or 
distribution of marijuana violates federal law, and banks that provide 
support for those activities face the risk of prosecution and assorted 
sanctions.’”183 
Still, FinCEN was quick to declare the guidance a success in 
opening the doors for marijuana banking. In August 2014, FinCEN 
Director Jennifer Shasky Calvery revealed that FinCEN had received 
502 “Marijuana Limited” reports.184 She also announced that based on 
the reports, “there are currently 105 individual financial institutions 
from states in more than one third of the country engaged in banking 
relationships with marijuana-related businesses.”185 Thus she conclud-
ed that “from our perspective the guidance is having the intended 
 
178. See Cole Marijuana Enforcement Memorandum 2013, supra note 33; 
FinCEN Marijuana-Related Businesses Guidance, supra note 33; 
Cole Marijuana Related Financial Crimes Memorandum, supra note 33. 
179. See supra notes 80–88 and accompanying text.  
180. FinCEN Marijuana-Related Businesses Guidance, supra note 33, 
at 1. 
181. See supra notes 57–59, 94–99, and accompanying text. 
182. Pete Yost, U.S. Offers Banks Rules On Marijuana, Boston Globe, 
Feb. 15, 2014, at B3.  
183. Andrew Grossman, Banks Can Do Business with Legal Pot Sellers, 
Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 2014, at B2.  
184. Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Dir., FinCEN, Remarks at the 2014 Mid-
Atlantic AML Conference 5 (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.fincen.gov/
news_room/speech/pdf/20140812.pdf.  
185. Id. at 4. 
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effect. It is facilitating access to financial services, while ensuring that 
this activity is transparent and the funds are going into regulated 
financial institutions responsible for implementing appropriate [anti–
money laundering] safeguards.”186 
But those who believe that the FinCEN and Department of 
Justice guidance entirely solves the marijuana-banking problem are 
wrong. First, the marijuana industry continues to report difficulty in 
securing access to banking services.187 Even if every “Marijuana Prior-
ity” report involved a separate marijuana business, the 502 reports 
cover far less than the state-legal marijuana industry. There are more 
than 502 state-licensed marijuana businesses in Colorado alone.188 
Second, it is far from clear that most financial institutions feel 
comfortable offering services to the marijuana industry. There are 
more than 13,000 banks and credit unions.189 The 105 institutions that 
have filed “Marijuana Priority” reports are a small drop in the bucket 
when considering the larger banking industry.190 Since the FinCEN 
guidance, some of the largest banks, including Bank of America and 
Wells Fargo, have reiterated their position: they do not offer services 
to the marijuana industry.191 Perhaps even more telling, press reports 
 
186. Id. at 5. 
187. See Rosenberg, supra note 11. 
188. Memorandum from the Colo. Legis. Council Staff, to Use of Recrea-
tional Marijuana Sales Tax Revenue Comm., Background on Marijuana 
Policy and Tax Revenue 2 (Aug. 11, 2014), available at http://www. 
colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2F
pdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1252029129668&s
sbinary=true (listing 496 medical marijuana centers, 152 medical 
marijuana–infused product manufacturers, 221 retail marijuana stores, 
66 retail marijuana product manufacturers, and 13 retail marijuana test-
ing facilities). Data on marijuana businesses in other states are not 
comprehensive. See, e.g., Jim Camden, State to Pursue Dispensaries’ 
Taxes, Spokesman-Rev. (Spokane, Wash.), May 1, 2014, at A6 
(reporting that Washington had 286 registered medical marijuana 
businesses); Emily Alpert Reyes, Taxing Illegal Pot Shops Targeted, 
L.A. Times,  Dec. 10, 2014, at AA3 (reporting that “[m]ore than 450 
medical marijuana shops have renewed their paperwork to pay business 
taxes”). 
189. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Annual Report 5 (2013) (reporting that 
the FDIC provided insurance for 6,800 institutions at the end of 2013); 
Nat’l Credit Union Admin., Annual Report 9 (2013) (reporting 
that there were 6,554 federally insured credit unions at the end of 2013). 
190. Furthermore, it is not clear that these 105 financial institutions began 
offering banking services in response to the guidance. A FinCEN report 
stated that “87 banks in Colorado had business relationships with 
marijuana dispensary businesses between June 2011 and September 
2012.” Wack, supra note 177. 
191. John Hielscher, The Problem with Financing Pot, Sarasota Herald-
Trib., Aug. 6, 2014, at A01 (“‘We abide by all federal laws, and the 
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rarely identify financial institutions that will provide banking services 
to the industry.192 FinCEN’s report data show that since the guidance, 
“[j]ust over 475 [reports] filed to date reflect ‘Marijuana Termi-
nation.’”193 This suggests financial institutions may actually be choos-
ing to end relationships with state-legal marijuana businesses.194  
It is not hard to see why financial institutions are still skittish. 
Marijuana is still illegal under federal law. The FinCEN and Depart-
ment of Justice guidance does not change that. Any bank or credit 
union providing services could face criminal prosecution at any 
time.195 Even if financial institutions were willing to rely on public 
statements about enforcement priorities, the Department of Justice’s 
assurance to banks is quite weak. It promises only that it “may not” 
 
distribution and sale of marijuana is illegal, so we don’t bank the sale 
of medical or recreational marijuana,’ said Cristie Drumm, a spokes-
woman for [Wells Fargo Bank].”); Rosenberg, supra note 11 (“‘As a 
federally regulated financial institution, we abide by federal law and do 
not bank marijuana-related businesses,’ said Mark Pipitone, a spokes-
man for Bank of America.”). 
192. My news search found only seven: O Bee Credit Union, Numerica Credit 
Union, Salal Credit Union, First Security Bank of Nevada, Mechanics 
Bank, Community Bank of the Bay, and Sterling Bank. Michael 
Muckian, Washington CUs Open “Joint” Biz Accounts, CREDIT UNION 
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2015, at 1 (reporting that O Bee Credit Union was 
among the “about two dozen banks and credit unions serving the 
[marijuana] industry”); Pot Banking Regulations So Close, Yet So Far 
Away, Spokesman-Rev. (Spokane, Wash.), May 9, 2014, at A13 
(reporting that in Washington Salal Credit Union and Numerica Credit 
Union will “accept growers and processors of marijuana as members”); 
Kathleen Pender, Banking on Legal Pot Biz, San Francisco Chron., 
May 25, 2010, at D1 (reporting that in California, Mechanics Bank, 
Community Bank of the Bay, and Sterling Bank all provide deposit and 
payment services for some medical marijuana dispensaries); Eli Segall, 
CEO Exits Las Vegas Bank for Marijuana Startup, Las Vegas Sun, 
Mar. 15, 2015, at 1 (reporting that First Security Bank of Nevada “had 
taken more than 50 clients who were looking to open medical marijuana 
companies”); see also David Migoya, Pot Shops in Colo. Keeping 
Account Info in the Bag, DENVER POST, Feb 28, 2014, at 9A (“Colorado 
Springs State Bank was the last institution in [Colorado] to openly bank 
marijuana businesses. That ended in 2011, when it closed about 300 
accounts, worried about banking businesses that are, under federal law, 
illegal.”). “Jenifer Waller, senior vice president at the Colorado Bankers 
Association, says she knows of fewer than 10 banks that have gone 
through a regulatory exam and gotten the OK” to offer banking services 
to the marijuana industry. Kevin Wack, Banks “Loosen Up” on Pot 
Business as FDIC Adopts Fincen Guidance, Am. Banker, Oct. 27, 
2014, at 1. 
193. Shasky Calvery, supra note 184. 
194. The data do not identify the location of the report or whether the report 
related to a business registered under a state marijuana law. Id. 
195. See supra Parts I.A and I.B. 
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prosecute financial institutions who provide financial services to state-
legal marijuana businesses. 196  Actual enforcement practices could 
change anytime—with or without warning.197  
Furthermore, the federal guidance seems to set the bar for 
financial institution compliance quite high. When comparing compli-
ance costs with the profits available from the growing but still small 
marijuana industry, banking the industry may not make economic 
sense.198 The paperwork associated with anti–money laundering re-
porting may be enough to dissuade some institutions from banking 
some marijuana businesses. 199  And then there is the problem of 
confirming that none of the institution’s customers deal with mari-
juana in a way that implicates the Department of Justice’s enforce-
ment priorities. Among other things, a financial institution needs to 
ensure that its customers do not sell marijuana to minors and do not 
sell marijuana to customers that may transport it across state lines.200 
Such due diligence efforts will be costly.201 Due to these concerns, 
 
196. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
197. See Toni Lapp, Legalized Marijuana Presents a Thorny Issue for 
Banks, Bank News, Apr. 2014, at 42 (“Furthermore, with regard to 
the banking activities of marijuana vendors, it is difficult to predict 
what stance the Justice Department in the next presidential 
administration will take.”). The statute of limitations for violations of 
the Controlled Substances Act and for money laundering is five years. 
18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2012). 
198. See Gordon Oliver, Where Will Legal Marijuana Stash Its Cash?, 
Columbian (Vancouver, Wash.), June 8, 2014, at A1 (observing that 
low interest rates and marijuana businesses’ limited need for large, long-
term capital investments mean that “the marijuana industry is not a 
sure-fire sugar daddy for Washington banks”); Kim Gittleson, Colo-
rado’s Marijuana Firms Beg Banks to Take Their Cash, BBC News 
(Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26248396 (“‘Quite 
honestly banks don’t care a lot right now—[marijuana business is] not a 
high priority for them at this point in time,’ says [Colorado Bankers 
Association President Don] Childears.”). 
199. See Wack, supra note 192 (reporting that, according to Lance Ott, a 
principal in Guardian Data Systems, the small number of banks 
handling marijuana business are “doing a hell of a lot of due diligence”). 
200. See supra notes 58, 94–99, and accompanying text. 
201. According to Robert Rowe III, Vice President and Senior Counsel at the 
American Bankers Association’s Center for Regulatory Compliance, “the 
only way [a bank] could even begin to come close to” ensuring that 
customers do not violate the Department of Justice and FinCEN 
guidance “would be [to have] an embedded employee who was at the 
business 24/7.” Josh Long, Fearful of Prosecution, Banks Still Shunning 
Marijuana Dispensaries, Natural Prods. Insider (June 16, 2014), 
http://www.naturalproductsinsider.com/news/2014/06/fearful-of-prosec 
ution-banks-still-shunning-mj.aspx (noting that even an embedded em-
ployee would not “guarantee[] . . . 100 percent compliance”); see also 
Banking the “Legal” Marijuana Industry Is Still a Risky Business, 
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some financial institutions that will accept accounts from marijuana 
growers will not accept accounts from marijuana dispensaries.202 Most 
financial institutions, however, seem to avoid marijuana businesses 
altogether. 
Finally, the Department of Justice and FinCEN are only two of 
the many federal authorities with regulatory oversight of financial 
institutions. Even if a financial institution felt confident that it could 
rely on Department of Justice and FinCEN guidance and that it could 
implement a robust (but economic) compliance program, the FDIC, 
NCUA, or Federal Reserve might determine that the institution was 
not effectively managing its risk and take civil enforcement action.203  
Recognizing the broad regulatory oversight of the federal banking 
agencies, the governors of Colorado and Washington sent a letter to 
the agencies asking for further clarification on the marijuana banking 
question.204 The Federal Reserve, FDIC, NCUA, and OCC responded 
with a joint letter that did little but confirm the uncertain state of 
marijuana banking.205  
 
Spencer Fane Britt & Browne LLP (Feb. 20, 2014, 9:35 AM), 
http://www.spencerfane.com/communitybankcounselors/blog.aspx?entr
y=508 (“Based upon the plain language of the Guidance, it would 
appear that a bank seeking to provide financial services to the legal 
marijuana industry is essentially tasked with active, day-to-day policing 
of these businesses in a manner that extends far beyond account moni-
toring.”). 
202. See Oliver, supra note 198 (reporting that Numerica Credit Union and 
Salal Credit Union do not bank marijuana retailers because “sales to 
minors or to out-of-state residents could put the credit unions at risk”); 
Missy Baxter, Washington Credit Unions Move to Serve Pot Growers, 
Credit Union Times, May 21, 2014, at 7 (“Salal opted to focus on 
growers and producers because it’s anticipated they will have fewer[] but 
larger transactions, and require relatively less oversight to comply with 
federal guidelines.”); see also Pender, supra note 192 (reporting that one 
bank described medical marijuana dispensaries as “‘more work [because] 
they are cash intensive’”). 
203. See supra Parts I.C–I.F. 
204. Letter from John W. Hickenlooper, Governor, Colorado, and Jay Inslee, 
Governor, Washington, to Janet Yellen, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve, Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, FDIC, Thomas J. 
Curry, Comptroller, OCC, and Debbie Matz, Chairman, NCUA (May 
23, 2014), available at http://www.governor.wa.gov/documents/ 
Financial_Regulation_Guidance_Request052314.pdf (stating that 
“[b]anks and credit unions in Colorado and Washington are waiting for 
the Federal Banking Agencies to furnish the instructions given to bank 
and credit union examiners before deciding whether and how to provide 
banking services to state licensed recreational marijuana businesses”). 
205. Letter from Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller, OCC, Martin J. Gruenberg, 
Chairman, FDIC, Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve, and Deborah Matz, Chairman, NCUA, to Jay Inslee, Governor, 
Washington (Aug. 13, 2014), available at http://www.dfi.wa.gov/ 
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According to the joint letter, “[t]he DOJ is primarily responsible 
for the interpretation and enforcement of federal criminal laws related 
to marijuana.”206 The letter explains that the Federal Reserve, FDIC, 
NCUA, and OCC are reviewing both the FinCEN and Department of 
Justice marijuana guidance “for inclusion in the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council BSA/Anti-Money Laundering 
Examination Manual.”207 
The letter also notes that “[a]s the Agencies have stated previ-
ously, generally the decision to open, close, or decline a particular 
account or relationship is made by a bank or credit union, without 
involvement by its supervisor.” 208  The letter suggests a financial 
institution’s decision to service an account should be “based on the 
bank or credit union’s particular business objectives, its evaluation of 
the risks associated with offering particular products or services, and 
its capacity and systems to effectively manage those risks.”209  
Yet the banking regulators’ joint letter stops short of sanctioning 
marijuana banking. It explains that “further clarity from Congress on 
the legal treatment of state-licensed marijuana-related businesses 
under federal law would provide greater legal certainty for both 
marijuana-related businesses and banks and credit unions.”210 This 
seems to acknowledge that the banking regulatory guidance does not 
override federal criminal law and is subject to change at any time. 
In sum, non-binding guidance from some of the federal officials 
that oversee banking activity is not sufficient to assure financial 
 
documents/banks/gov-inslee-interagency-response.pdf [hereinafter Joint 
Agency Letter].  
206. Id.; see also Wack, supra note 192 (“The FDIC’s decision to use the 
guidance is significant because federal banking agencies had previ-
ously refused to say whether they’d align themselves with the 
document . . . .”). 
207. Joint Agency Letter, supra note 205. There are some anecdotal reports 
that after the FinCEN guidance, a very small number of banks have 
gone through a regulatory examination and received tacit approval from 
their regulators to engage in some form of marijuana banking. David 
Migoya, Bank Regulators’ Thawing Position, Denver Post, Oct. 22, 
2014, at 14A (reporting that some “banks have received ‘tacit’ and 
‘passive’ approval from regulators to continue the banking relationship 
with marijuana businesses”); Wack, supra note 192 (reporting that fewer 
than ten banks had passed through a regulatory exam without receiving 
sanctions for marijuana banking). On the other hand, there are also 
anecdotal reports that after the FinCEN guidance, some NCUA 
examiners are instructing credit unions that there is no legal way to 
bank the marijuana industry. Missy Baxter, CUs Forces [sic] to Close 
Marijuana Accounts, Credit Union Times, Oct. 29, 2014, at 1. 
208. Joint Agency Letter, supra note 205. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
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institutions they can offer services to the state-legal marijuana indus-
try without risking federal reprisal.  
B. State-Chartered Financial Cooperatives 
When the federal guidance failed to alleviate the marijuana 
banking problems, Colorado tried to take matters into its own hands. 
In 2014 Colorado passed legislation allowing licensed marijuana busi-
nesses to form financial services cooperatives.211 These “cannabis cre-
dit co-ops”212 are empowered to provide financial services, including 
deposit services and loans, to marijuana-related businesses.213 Entities 
eligible for co-op membership include “licensed marijuana businesses, 
industrial hemp businesses, and entities that provide goods or services 
to licensed marijuana businesses and that provide documentation to 
the co-op of an inability to get comparable services from a bank or 
credit union.”214  
Although Colorado cannabis credit co-ops do not need to secure 
federal deposit insurance215 and will not be owned by a federally 
regulated holding company,216 the co-ops are still dependent upon 
federal banking regulators. To be granted a charter, each co-op must 
“provide the Commissioner written evidence of approval by the Fed-
eral Reserve System Board of Governors for access by the co-op to the 
 
211. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 11-33-101 to -128 (2014); see also David Migoya, 
“Is the Fed Going to Do What the Banks Won’t Already Do? No.” 
Marijuana Financial Co-ops Face More Work, but Analysts Say They’re 
Unlikely to Succeed, Denver Post, May 18, 2014, at 6K (noting that 
the legislation was passed because “[f]ederal regulators and prosecutors 
have done little to alleviate the [marijuana banking] logjam, offering 
advice on how to approach the issue, but ultimately causing banks to 
keep what could be a lucrative relationship at arm’s length”). 
212. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 11-33-104(1), -108(2) (noting that a co-op may be 
called a “cannabis credit cooperative,” “marijuana credit cooperative,” 
“cannabis credit co-op,” “marijuana credit co-op,” “cannabis financial 
services cooperative,” “marijuana financial services cooperative,” 
“cannabis financial services co-op,” or “marijuana financial services  
co-op”). 
213. See id. § 11-33-107 (describing the powers of a cannabis credit co-op). A 
co-op may also “[m]ake deposits in state and national financial 
institutions insured by an agency of the federal government” and invest 
in government securities. Id. 
214. Id. § 11-33-106(2)(a) (describing entities eligible for membership in a 
cannabis credit co-op). 
215. Indeed, each co-op must disclose to its members and prospective members 
that it is “[n]ot federally insured.” Id. § 11-33-106(4)(a)(II)(B). 
216. See id. § 11-33-116 (noting that “[t]he capital of a cannabis credit co-op 
consists of the payments that have been made to it in shares by its 
members”). 
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Federal Reserve System in connection with the proposed depository 
activities of the co-op.”217  
By requiring that any cannabis credit co-op get “approval . . . for 
access . . . to the Federal Reserve System,” the Colorado legislature 
was trying to ensure that any co-op would have access to the pay-
ment services provided by the Federal Reserve.218 After all, lack of 
access to payment systems was the primary banking problem 
lawmakers hoped the cannabis credit co-ops would alleviate.219 Unless 
the Federal Reserve granted access to its payment systems, the co-ops 
would not be able to effectively meet the marijuana industry’s bank-
ing needs.  
Is the Federal Reserve likely to grant cannabis credit co-ops 
access to any of the Fed’s payment services? Most commentators say 
no, although few offer a precise legal basis for their conclusion.220 
One potential problem is that, by design, cannabis credit co-ops 
are not banks or credit unions. Under the Monetary Control Act of 
 
217. Id. § 11-33-104(4)(a). 
218. The language of the statute is somewhat vague and could possibly be 
read as requiring membership in the Federal Reserve System. But it is 
not clear that a cannabis credit co-op would qualify for membership in 
the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve membership is open to all 
state-chartered banks. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
However, under Colorado law, a cannabis credit co-op is not a bank and 
cannot use “the word ‘bank’ . . . in its articles of incorporation, trade 
name, or an advertisement or offer of services.” Id. § 11-33-108.  
Furthermore, Colorado law regarding “bank” charters specifically 
authorizes banks to purchase Federal Reserve stock. See id. § 11-103-
603. The cannabis credit co-ops were not granted that power. Id. at 
§ 11-33-107 (describing the powers of a cannabis credit co-op).  
219. See id. § 11-33-102 (noting that “most Colorado-licensed marijuana 
businesses must operate almost entirely on a cash-only basis”). 
220. See, e.g., Ray Birch, Marijuana Industry Needs a Light From CUs and 
Banks, Credit Union J., Aug. 4, 2014, at 1 (“‘The cannabis credit co-
ops will be violating federal law, as well, and the assumption is that 
the Federal Reserve won’t allow the cooperatives access to the ACH 
system if they are violating federal law,’ [Michael Elliott, executive 
director of the Marijuana Industry Group,] said.”); Heather Draper, 
Colorado’s New Cannabis Co-Ops Law: Bankers, Pot Advocates Agree 
It Probably Won’t Work, Denver Bus. J. (June 9, 2014, 7:35 AM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/blog/finance_etc/2014/06/colorado
s-new-cannabis-co-ops-law-bankers-pot.html?page=all (“‘They’ll never 
get access to the Federal Reserve System, and if they can’t do that, the 
co-ops will never be formed,’ [Don Childears, president and CEO of the 
Colorado Bankers Association,] said.”); Migoya, supra note 211 (“‘Argu-
ably it’s all a charade, thinking that some members of the (Federal 
Reserve) board . . . will allow access to the payment system,’ said Bert 
Ely, a banking structure consultant in Alexandria, Va.”).  
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1980,221 the Federal Reserve must provide services to “nonmember 
depository institutions” at the same price as it does to members of the 
Federal Reserve.222 “Depository institution” is defined to include all 
federally insured financial institutions.223 “Depository institution” also 
includes banks, mutual savings banks, savings banks, credit unions, 
and savings associations that are eligible to apply for federal deposit 
or share insurance.224 The cannabis credit co-op does not fit into any 
of those categories. According to Colorado law, a cannabis credit co-
op cannot be federally insured.225 Furthermore, a cannabis credit co-op 
is not a bank or credit union and cannot use “bank” or “credit union” 
in its name. 226  Thus, the co-ops are not the type of financial 
institution to which Congress expected the Federal Reserve to 
regularly provide payment services. 
Perhaps the Federal Reserve could interpret the Money Control 
Act to allow services to additional types of financial institutions, but 
so far it has not done so. Instead, Operating Circular 1, which governs 
access to Federal Reserve services, refers to the statutory definition of 
“depository institution,” which includes various types of banks and 
credit unions.227  
Colorado cannabis credit co-ops might argue that under the 
Money Control Act, the Federal Reserve should give “due regard  
to . . . the provision of an adequate level of [payment] services 
nationwide.”228 The co-ops may argue that the marijuana industry 
clearly lacks access to basic payment services.229 The efficacy of this 
argument, however, would be undercut so long as marijuana is illegal 
under federal law. Any illegal enterprise is likely to have difficulty 
accessing payment systems. That is precisely the purpose of anti–
money laundering laws.  
If the Federal Reserve provided payment services to a cannabis 
credit co-op, the Federal Reserve and its employees would be engag-
 
221.  Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified in scattered sections 
throughout 12 U.S.C.). 
222. 12 U.S.C. § 248a (2012). 
223. Id. § 461(b)(1)(a). 
224. Id. 
225. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-33-106(4)(a)(II)(B) (2014). 
226. Id. § 11-33-108. 
227. Fed. Circular 1, supra note 160, at § 2.2.  
228. 12 U.S.C. § 248a(c)(3) (2012). 
229. Members of any cannabis credit co-op must “provide[] documentation to 
the co-op of an inability to get comparable services from a bank or 
credit union.” Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 11-33-103(5), 11-33-104(2)(a)(II) 
(2014). 
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ing in money laundering.230 They might also be conspiring to manu-
facture and distribute marijuana, aiding and abetting the manufacture 
and distribution of marijuana, and acting as accessories after the fact 
for the manufacture and distribution of marijuana.231 Even if many 
policymakers at the Federal Reserve were convinced of the necessity 
of marijuana banking, it is difficult to imagine the Federal Reserve 
openly defying federal drug law.232  
But federal hurdles are not the only impediments to the creation 
of cannabis credit co-ops. First, a group of marijuana businesses must 
decide to form a co-op. Given the legal uncertainty, private actors 
may be unwilling to invest in start-up plans for a co-op. So far, 
Colorado has not received any applications.233 Indeed, one group of 
financial institution organizers interested in marijuana banking have 
decided to pursue a standard credit union charter rather than a 
cannabis credit co-op charter.234 Second, Colorado must develop an 
administrative structure for regulating co-ops235—a process that could 
take several years. 236  According to Chris Myklebust, Colorado’s 
 
230. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
231. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
232. The Federal Reserve is currently considering a master account 
application from Fourth Corner Credit Union. See supra notes 164–171 
and accompanying text. While Colorado granted Fourth Corner’s 
charter under the standard credit union statute rather than the 
cannabis credit co-op statute, the credit union plans to primarily serve 
the marijuana industry. See supra notes 131–132. Thus, the Federal 
Reserve’s decision on Fourth Corner’s application may inform what the 
Federal Reserve would do if presented with an application from a 
cannabis credit co-op.  
233. David Migoya, Green Light Doesn’t Suffice, Denver Post, Sept. 14, 
2014, at 7K. 
234. See supra notes 131–135, 164–171, and accompanying text (describing 
organizers’ efforts to form Fourth Corner Credit Union in Colorado). 
235. See Migoya, supra note 211 (quoting Chris Myklebust, Colorado 
Commissioner of the Division of Financial Services, as stating that 
Colorado needs to “put rules into place, come up with standards and 
bylaws, and a foundation for what one of these cooperatives will look 
like from an organizational standpoint”). 
236. See Migoya, supra note 211 (reporting that Chris Mykelbust, Colorado 
Commissioner of the Division of Financial Services, believes the 
regulatory structure will not be completed until 2015, or “more likely 
2016”). This timing could create a pointless standoff between federal 
and state regulators. In order for the Federal Reserve to grant access to 
its payment systems, Colorado would need to robustly regulate the co-
ops. The Federal Reserve does not typically perform extensive due 
diligence before granting an eligible financial institution access to its 
services. See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text. However, the 
Federal Reserve might rethink this policy if Colorado’s regulatory 
system was undeveloped or insufficient to inspire confidence and trust. 
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Commissioner of the Division of Financial Services, “[r]ule-making 
wouldn’t occur until after access to the federal system was granted 
and an application [was] approved by [the Colorado 
Commissioner].”237 As part of the approval process, Colorado regula-
tory authorities would “convene a stakeholder group, including all 
trade associations representing banks and credit unions, to identify 
conflicts that may exist” between the cannabis credit co-op law and 
other state law.238 Banking trade associations may be hostile to co-
ops, particularly if co-ops can bank customers who are off limits to 
traditional financial institutions.239 Regulators may not grant any co-
op charters “until the general assembly resolves all of the identified 
state law conflicts.”240  
Finally, even if Colorado authorities issue a cannabis credit co-op 
charter, it is not clear that the co-op could operate consistent with 
Colorado law. Under Colorado law, the co-op must “comply with all 
applicable requirements of federal law, including . . . [t]he federal 
‘Bank Secrecy Act.’”241 Yet, elsewhere, the Colorado statute requires a 
co-op to disclose to its members that “[f]ederal law does not authorize 
financial institutions, including marijuana financial services coopera-
tives, to accept proceeds from activity that is illegal under federal law, 
such as that from licensed marijuana businesses.”242 If a cannabis 
credit co-op must comply with federal law and cannot accept deposits 
from state-legal marijuana businesses, it will likely be of little use to 
the marijuana industry.   
Colorado, on the other hand, seems unwilling to develop a regulatory 
structure until the Federal Reserve has granted access to its system. See 
supra note 235; see also Migoya, supra note 233 (“The legislation is still 
scant in details, with a cart-before-the horse sense about it. A group 
cannot apply to [Colorado] for approval until it has gotten tacit 
approval from the Federal Reserve board. And the Federal Reserve 
doesn’t usually do anything tacitly. But it also can’t approve access to 
the financial system without a formal application, and only a real bank 
or financial service can apply.”). 
237. Migoya, supra note 233. 
238. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-33-104(4)(b)(II) (2014). 
239. See Heather Draper, “Cannabis Credit Co-ops” Bill Aims to Get 
Colorado Pot Businesses Access to Fed Payment System, Denver Bus. 
J. (May 1, 2014, 5:32 PM) http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/ 
blog/finance_etc/2014/05/cannabis-credit-co-ops-bill-aims-to-get-
colorado.html?page=all (reporting that the Colorado Bankers Associ-
ation was “neutral” on the co-op legislation because it did not believe 
the legislation would work, and the Independent Bankers of Colorado 
were opposed to the legislation because it created “an entirely new type 
of financial institution”). 
240. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-33-104(4)(b)(II). 
241. Id. § 11-33-126(1)(a). 
242. Id. § 11-33-106(4)(a)(I). 
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Given the potential problems with cannabis credit co-ops, some 
believe that the primary utility of Colorado’s legislation is to “force 
the federal government’s hand” on the issue of marijuana banking.243 
Colorado Commissioner Myklebust explains: “We want an answer, on 
the record, a written response. Can we do this?”244 Others think the 
co-op legislation might motivate Congress to address the marijuana 
banking issue.245 It is still too soon to say whether the co-op legislation 
will motivate action by federal legislators or regulators. One thing, 
however, is clear: Colorado’s cannabis credit co-op legislation is not 
itself the solution to the marijuana banking problem. 
III. The Path to Banking Service 
Department of Justice and FinCEN guidance failed to adequately 
address marijuana banking. Colorado’s cannabis credit co-op legis-
lation will also fail to provide banking for the marijuana industry. 
These failed attempts show that for banking services to become 
widely available to the marijuana industry, Congress must act. But 
federal legislation alone may not be enough. Federal financial regula-
tors have broad authority over all financial institutions. Regulators 
may be tempted to use this authority to require that banks and credit 
unions police the marijuana industry’s compliance with state and 
federal law. If compliance costs are too high or the risk of punishment 
too great, financial institutions will continue to avoid the marijuana 
industry. Marijuana banking requires not just clear statutory author-
ity to provide services; it requires a regulatory and enforcement 
approach recognizing the benefits of bringing the state-legal marijuana 
industry within the mainstream banking system. 
A. Congressional Action 
Marijuana banking access problems cannot be solved by the states 
acting alone for two reasons. First, marijuana is illegal under federal 
law. Second, federal law enforcement and federal financial regulators 
 
243. Migoya, supra note 211 (“[The cannabis credit co-op bill] was conceived 
by marijuana-industry stakeholders, with help from Gov. John 
Hickenlooper’s office, as a means to force the federal government’s hand 
at deciding with finality whether pot and banking can go together.”). 
244. Id.; see also Gail Sullivan, With Regular Banks Wary of Pot, Colorado 
Lawmakers Okay Special Bank for Marijuana Trade, Wash. Post (May 
8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014
/05/08/colorado-lawmakers-okay-pot-bank/ (reporting that Colorado 
state Senator Pat Stedman explained the co-op legislation was an 
attempt to “force a dialogue” in Washington). 
245. Draper, supra note 239 (“‘If it doesn’t work, this says to Congress, “Get 
off the dime. You need to address [marijuana banking],”’ [Don] Childears[, 
president and CEO of the Colorado Bankers Association,] said.”). 
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have significant power to punish institutions that do not comply with 
federal law. Unless Congress acts to remove one or both of those 
barriers, most financial institutions will not provide services to the 
marijuana industry. Nearly all commentators agree congressional 
action is necessary.246 Even FinCEN Director Jennifer Shasky Calvery 
concedes marijuana banking is “a unique and complex issue” and 
“only legislative change can fully and completely address it.”247 
Congress could facilitate banking services for the marijuana 
industry by legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana. Federal legislation 
would not necessarily mean that all marijuana-related activities are 
allowed. Congress could choose to legalize only some marijuana-
related activities (medical use, use by adults, etc.). Alternatively, 
Congress could broadly decriminalize marijuana instead allowing 
states freedom to determine marijuana policies. Even if Congress 
chooses not to criminalize the possession, sale, or cultivation of 
marijuana, states could impose their own prohibitions and restrict-
ions.248 From a banking perspective, the key is that marijuana-related 
entities must have the capacity to operate without running afoul of 
state or federal law. If marijuana businesses cannot operate without 
violating federal and state law, and banks must follow the law, then 
banks will not be able to provide services to marijuana businesses. 
Another option for congressional action is legislation aimed 
narrowly at the marijuana banking problem. Rather than adjust the 
legality of marijuana, Congress could excuse banks from complying 
with the law.249 Proposals in this vein range from expansive to narrow. 
 
246. See, e.g., Alex Altman, Colorado’s New Pot Banking Law Won’t Solve 
Cash Problems, Time (June 6, 2014), http://time.com/2839059/color
ados-new-pot-banking-law-wont-solve-cash-problems/; Don Childears, 
Opinion, Marijuana Industry Banking Requires an Act of Congress, 
Denver Post, Feb. 12, 2014, at 19A; Jeffrey S. Gard, Banks, Stay 
Wary of Marijuana-Related Businesses, Am. Banker (Mar. 18, 2014, 
2:02 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/banks-stay-
wary-of-marijuana-related-businesses-1066321-1.html.  
247. Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Dir., FinCEN, Remarks at the Association 
of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (ACAMS) 19th 
Annual International AML and Financial Crime Conference (Mar. 
18, 2014), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/speech/ 
html/20140318.html.  
248. Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug 
Laws in an Age of State Reforms, 13 Chap. L. Rev. 555, 562 (2010) 
(“[U]nless the federal government decided to preempt state law, it could 
not unilaterally ‘legalize’ a controlled substance even if it wanted to.”). 
249. See David Blake & Jack Finlaw, Marijuana Legalization in Colorado: 
Learned Lessons, 8 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 359, 371 (2014) (noting 
that such legislation “may be . . . the only real solution to the [mari-
juana] banking dilemma”). 
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On the expansive end of the spectrum is a 2013 bill introduced by 
Representative Ed Perlmutter from Colorado—the Marijuana Busi-
ness Access to Banking Act.250 Under the bill, “[a] depository institu-
tion that provides financial services to a marijuana-related legitimate 
business, and the officers, directors, and employees of that depository 
institution, shall be immune from Federal criminal prosecution or 
investigation for providing those services.” 251  Additionally, federal 
banking regulators could not “terminate or limit deposit insurance” or 
“prohibit, penalize or otherwise discourage a depository institution 
from providing financial services to a marijuana-related legitimate 
business.”252 The bill, however, has not been reported out of commit-
tee and seems unlikely to gain traction.253 Still, legislation that, like 
Representative Perlmutter’s bill, directly addresses many of the 
impediments to marijuana banking may hold hope for future 
marijuana banking.254  
Other proposed federal marijuana banking legislation is narrower. 
In July 2014, as part of the financial services appropriations bill, the 
House of Representatives passed a provision introduced by Repre-
sentative Denny Heck from Washington.255 The provision would prohi-
bit funds appropriated by the bill from being used 
to penalize a financial institution solely because the institution 
provides financial services to an entity that is a manufacturer, 
producer, or a person that participates in any business or organ-
ized activity that involves handling marijuana or marijuana pro-
ducts and engages in such activity pursuant to a law established 
by a State or a unit of local government.256 
To become law, the provision would need to be approved by the 
Senate and President as well. Even if enacted, the provision is 
insufficient to open doors to marijuana banking. Federal financial 
 
250. Marijuana Businesses Access to Banking Act of 2013, H.R. 2652, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
251. Id. § 3. 
252. Id. § 2. 
253. See Blake & Finlaw, supra note 249, at 371 (noting that “the chances of 
[the Marijuana Business Access to Banking Act] moving through a 
gridlocked Congress any time soon seem very low”). 
254. Even the proposed Marijuana Business Access to Banking Act is 
somewhat incomplete. For example, it does not address federal financial 
regulation or enforcement aimed at bank holding companies. It also does 
not mention share insurance provided by the NCUA and does not directly 
address access to the Federal Reserve’s payment systems services. 
255. Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, H.R. 
5016, 113th Cong. § 916 (as passed by House, July 16, 2014). 
256. Id. 
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institution regulators generally do not rely on congressional appropri-
ations for funding. The FDIC, NCUA, and Federal Reserve are all 
funded by assessments on regulated institutions and investment 
income.257 In addition, the provision does not change federal prosecu-
tors’ ability to bring criminal charges related to marijuana banking. 
Thus, even with the appropriations rider, federal law enforcement and 
federal financial regulators would retain significant power to punish 
financial institutions for providing marijuana banking services.  
In sum, marijuana banking requires congressional action. Congress 
can either decriminalize marijuana or protect financial institutions 
from federal punishment or both. Congressional measures that leave 
open the possibility federal officials will punish financial institutions 
that provide services to the marijuana industry will not be sufficient. 
B. Reasonable Federal Banking Regulation 
While congressional action is a necessary first step toward bank-
ing the marijuana industry, congressional action may not be suffic-
ient. Federal legislative reforms will almost certainly leave the system 
of federal financial regulators intact. Federal anti–money laundering 
laws will remain in effect. Federal regulators will retain their author-
ity to supervise the safety and soundness of financial institutions. And 
the Federal Reserve will continue to offer its payment services. If 
current regulatory guidance is any indication,258 federal regulators may 
use anti–money laundering and safety and soundness concerns as 
justifications to set a high bar for financial institution due diligence 
when dealing with the marijuana industry. If the compliance bar is so 
high that any customer misstep can result in federal criminal or civil 
liability for the financial institution, then marijuana banking will not 
occur.  
To be sure, some due diligence is reasonable and warranted. 
Financial institutions can and should check to make sure customers 
have the necessary permits to operate a marijuana-related business. 
Institutions can file suspicious activity reports when transactions seem 
inconsistent with normal business operations. Institutions could even 
monitor press reports to check for indications that customers are 
involved in illegal activity.259 
 
257. See Richard Scott Carnell, Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, The Law of Financial Institutions 61–62 (5th ed. 2013). 
FinCEN does receive congressional appropriations. See Financial 
Services and General Government Appropriations Act, H.R. 5016, 113th 
Cong. (as passed by House, July 16, 2014). 
258. See supra notes 58, 94–99, and accompanying text.  
259. Current FinCEN guidance requires that financial institutions check for 
these and other “red flags.” FinCEN Marijuana-Related Businesses 
Guidance, supra note 33, at 5–7. 
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On the other hand, financial institutions are not well equipped to 
ensure that marijuana-related businesses are fully compliant with 
federal and state law. For example, a financial institution cannot 
easily confirm that its customer is not selling marijuana to minors. 
Likewise, a financial institution cannot guarantee that its customer is 
not selling marijuana that is later transported to a state where mari-
juana is illegal.260 While such stringent compliance requirements may 
be justified when marijuana is illegal under federal law, such require-
ments would not be justified if Congress decriminalizes marijuana or 
prevents federal punishment for marijuana banking. If Congress opens 
the door for marijuana banking, federal financial regulators should 
ensure their efforts do not practically prevent banks from servicing 
the marijuana industry.  
Conclusion 
During the 1992 presidential campaign, a reporter asked candi-
date Bill Clinton whether he had ever smoked pot. Soon-to-become-
President Clinton famously responded that he had “experimented” 
with it but “didn’t inhale.”261 This provides an apt metaphor for the 
federal government’s current approach to banking the marijuana 
industry. On one hand, the Department of Justice and FinCEN seem 
to be experimenting with marijuana. Their guidance suggests they will 
not punish financial institutions for providing services to state-legal 
marijuana-related businesses. On the other hand, the federal govern-
ment’s marijuana experimentation falls far short of a deep inhale. 
Marijuana is illegal under federal law. Financial institutions that 
service the marijuana industry face possible federal criminal and civil 
punishment. As long as marijuana banking is illegal and punishable 
under federal law, financial institutions will avoid state-legal 
marijuana businesses. 
For the state-legal marijuana industry to access banking, reforms 
must begin with Congress. Congress could open the door to marijuana 
banking by either decriminalizing marijuana or by removing criminal 
and civil penalties associated with marijuana banking. At the same 
time, federal financial regulators must set achievable due diligence 
expectations for banks offering services to the marijuana industry. If 
federal regulators unreasonably require financial institutions to police 
marijuana businesses’ compliance with all federal and state law, insti-
tutions will continue to avoid the marijuana industry. 
 
260. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
261. Thomas Petzinger Jr., Clinton and Brown Run into Questions Involving 
Some of Their Past Actions, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1992, at A12 
(“[W]hen I was in England, I experimented with marijuana a time or 
two. And didn’t like it and didn’t inhale, and never tried it again.” 
(quoting Bill Clinton)). 
